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Combatting Torture: Revitalizing the
Toscanino Exception to the
Ker-Frisbie Doctrine
I. INTRODUCTION
The abduction of individuals from other nations to face justice in
United States courts has increased at an alarming rate in recent
years.I The number of district court cases in which abducted defend-
ants have alleged acts of torture and brutality by United States law
enforcement officials has also increased. 2 The United States judiciary
has tolerated this alleged police misconduct by applying the long-
standing rule commonly known as the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, which
broadly holds that the manner in which a defendant is brought to trial
does not affect the court's ability to try the case.
3
This Comment will examine the Ker and Frisbie decisions in
which the United States Supreme Court held that pretrial police mis-
conduct is irrelevant to court processes because "due process of law is
satisfied when one present in court is convicted of a crime after having
been fairly apprised of the charges against him and after a fair trial in
accordance with constitutional procedural safeguards." '4 This Com-
ment then discusses the exception to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine set forth
by the Second Circuit in United States v. Toscanino.5 In Toscanino,
the court held that due process of law requires United States courts to
divest themselves of jurisdiction where the defendant's presence at
trial has been acquired as a result of the government's "deliberate,
unnecessary and unreasonable invasion of the accused's constitutional
rights."' 6 The exact legal basis for the Toscanino exception was ini-
1. Moss, Official Kidnapping, 1991 A.B.A. J. 24; Abramovsky & Eagle, US. Policy in
Approaching Alleged Offenders Abroad: Extradition, Abduction or Irregular Rendition, 57 OR.
L. REV. 51, 84-85 (1977).
2. Moss, supra note 1, at 24; Abramovsky & Eagle, supra note 1, at 84-85.
3. The Ker-Frisbie doctrine is based on Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886) and Frisbie
v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
4. Frisbie, 342 U.S. at 522.
5. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
6. Id. at 275.
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tially unclear. On its face, it required United States courts to exclude
the body of the defendant when his presence in court was the product
of an illegal arrest.
7
Shortly after Toscanino, the Second Circuit clarified and severely
limited the scope of the exception in Lujan v. Gengler8 and United
States v. Lira.9 These cases limited the divestiture of jurisdiction to
cases where United States law enforcement officials or their agents 10
directly participated in "cruel, inhuman, and outrageous treatment"
of detainees." Accordingly, mere illegal arrest, absent cruel and out-
rageous treatment, remains proper under the Ker-Frisbie doctrine.
This Comment discusses the line of cases following Lujan and
Lira which further narrow the Toscanino exception as it applies to
outrageous treatment and torture. These cases require an extremely
high level of police brutality to invoke the Toscanino exclusionary
rule. In fact, the United States judiciary has interpreted the standard
of brutality in such a way as to render the Toscanino exception virtu-
ally ineffective in deterring even the most heinous police misconduct.
In the sixteen years since Toscanino, not a single defendant has suc-
ceeded in proving police misconduct sufficient to divest the court of
jurisdiction. Even more disconcerting is the recent willingness of the
Seventh Circuit to countenance almost any form of pretrial mistreat-
ment by holding that the Toscanino exception is no longer viable at
all, at least as far as it creates an exclusionary remedy.' 2
In contrast to this judicial acquiescence to official brutality, the
United States Senate recently ratified the United Nations Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment ("United Nations Convention Against Torture"). 3
The Convention requires member states to "take effective legislative,
administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of
torture." '4
This Comment will show that a well-defined Toscanino exception
7. Id.
8. 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975).
9. 515 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1975).
10. Id at 70.
11. Lujan, 510 F.2d at 65.
12. Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 209.
(1990).
13. 136 CONG. REC. S17486-92 (Oct. 27, 1990).
14. United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrad-
ing Treatment or Punishment, art. 2(1), G.A. Res. 46, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 39) at 395,
U.N. Doc. A/51 (1984) [hereinafter United Nations Convention Against Torture].
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utilizing an exclusionary remedy is the only effective means of deter-
ring police misconduct and satisfying the United States' obligations
under the United Nations Convention Against Torture. In fact, the
failure of United States courts to apply Toscanino has insidiously en-
couraged United States law enforcement to engage in, acquiesce to,
and accept the benefits of the brutalization of pretrial detainees.
This Comment proposes that the United States Supreme Court
confirm the Toscanino exception as it applies to torture and brutality
by United States police.15 The revitalized Toscanino exception should
either be based directly on the provisions of the United Nations Con-
vention Against Torture or on a traditional due process analysis. This
Comment suggests that the most practical and effective bases for the
Toscanino exception are the due process clauses of the fifth and four-
teenth amendments. Moreover, United States courts should incorpo-
rate into the due process analysis the standard of outrageous police
misconduct recognized in international law and defined in the United
Nations Convention Against Torture. 16 This Comment also proposes
specific evidentiary procedures to effectively determine when police
15. This Comment focuses on revitalizing the narrow Toscanino exception as it applies to
torture. Many commentators have argued that courts should prohibit all abductions as viola-
tions of the fourth amendment or customary international law. I.A. SHEARER, EXTRADITION
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 75 (1971); Abramovsky & Eagle, supra note 1, at 52-55; M.C. BAS-
SIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE 190 (1987).
However, abduction is firmly entrenched in United States law enforcement policy as an accept-
able alternative to formal extradition processes. This is attributable to the impracticability or
unavailability of extradition due to "the unwillingness of asylum states to abide by the provi-
sions of extradition treaties; the inapplicability of extradition treaties to either the offense or
the offender; or the need for immediate apprehension which cannot be accommodated by the
often lengthy and complicated procedures contained in bilateral extradition treaties."
Abramovsky & Eagle, supra note 1, at 92.
16. Torture is one of humankind's most abhorrent crimes and is almost universally con-
demned. Moor & Nichols, Combatting Torture in the 'f0s, 17 HUM. RTs. 1, 28 (1990). Many
international agreements condemn torture, including the following: Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, art. 5, G.A. Res. 217 A (III) at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), reprinted in R.
LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS 440.1 (1986) (no one shall be sub-
jected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment); African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights, Organization of African Unity, art. 5, (1981), reprinted in 21
I.L.M. 58 (1982) (every individual shall have the right to the respect of the dignity inherent in
a human being and to the recognition of his legal status. All forms of exploitation and degra-
dation of man, particularly slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading punish-
ment and treatment shall be prohibited); Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights, art.
7 (1981) (no person shall be subjected to torture in mind or body, or degraded, or threatened
with injury either to himself or to anyone related to or held dear by him); International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 7, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; European Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 3, 213
U.N.T.S. 221; American Convention on Human Rights, art. 5, para. 2, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, at
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mistreatment of pretrial detainees violates due process. For example,
when a defendant makes a prima facie showing that he or she was
subjected to torture or outrageous brutality, the burden of proof
should shift to the prosecution to show that United States agents did
not knowingly participate or acquiesce in the misconduct.
The United States has been a leader in condemning torture and
illegal abduction and is a party to many international human rights
instruments denouncing these acts. 17 However, the much publicized
1, O.A.S. off. Rec. OEA/ser.L/V/II.23, doc. 21, rev. 2 (1969), reprinted in R. LILLICH, supra,
at 190.1.
17. Over the last 20 years, the United States government has made great efforts to curb
torture around the world. See Moor & Nichols, supra note 16, at 28. In the 1970s, the legisla-
tive and executive branches of the United States government took steps to ensure that eco-
nomic aid would only go to countries that respect fundamental human rights. Between 1976
and 1979, Congress passed 25 bills linking the human rights practices of nations to United
States foreign policies. For example, in 1975, Congress amended section 102 of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 to state:
No assistance may be provided. . . to the government of any country which engages
in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights,
including torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or denial of the right to
life, liberty, and the security of person, unless such assistance will directly benefit the
needy people in such country.
22 U.S.C. § 2151n(a) (Supp. V. 1975) (amending 22 U.S.C. § 2151 (1970)).
In 1976, Congress also amended section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
pertaining to the discretion of the President of the United States to conduct international se-
curity assistance programs. The amendment stated: "Except under circumstances specified in
this section, no security assistance may be provided to any country the government of which
engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights."
22 U.S.C.A. § 2304 (Supp." III 1976) (amending 22 U.S.C. § 2304 (Supp. IV 1974)).
In 1984, a Joint Resolution of Congress expressed support for the involvement of the
United States government in the formulation of international standards and effective imple-
mentation mechanisms against torture, particularly through the United Nations Convention
Against Torture. See United Nations Convention Against Torture, supra note 14. The Con-
vention was opened for signature on December 10, 1984 and entered into force June 26, 1987.
The United States Departments of State, Justice, and Defense recommended various dec-
larations and reservations that were instrumental in formulating the official definition of tor-
ture in the United Nations Convention Against Torture. J.H. BURGERS & H. DANELIUS, THE
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE: A HANDBOOK ON THE CONVENTION
AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUN-
ISHMENT 41-42 (1988).
The United States government endorsed defining torture as:
[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intention-
ally inflicted on a person . . . when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person
acting in an official capacity.
Id. at 44. See also Bassiouni & Derby, The Crime of Torture, in 1 M.C. BASSIOUNI, INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CRIMES 363 (1986); Boulesbaa, An Analysis of the 1984 Draft Con-
vention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 4
DICK. J. INT'L L. 185 (1986).
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"war on drugs"18 has prompted United States law enforcement agen-
cies to increase their use of abduction and other illegal means of ap-
prehending and interrogating suspects outside of the United States'
borders.19 Judicial acquiescence to acts of brutality and torture com-
mitted by United States agents cannot be reconciled with the basic
tenets of the Bill of Rights. Only by maintaining consistency and con-
gruity between international policy on torture, and judicial condem-
nation of brutality by United States law enforcement, can the United
States maintain judicial integrity, respect for its criminal justice sys-
tem, and credibility in its condemnation of such egregious acts. Revi-
talizing the Toscanino exception, at least as far as it applies to
brutality and torture, is an essential first step in this process.
II. THE KER-FRISBIE DOCTRINE
For more than one hundred years, United States courts have im-
plicitly sanctioned lawlessness by assuming in personam jurisdiction
over criminal defendants whom law enforcement officials have ille-
gally apprehended and forcibly brought into the courts' jurisdiction.
20
This implied sanction is embodied in the well-established rule of law
that the power of United States courts to try a person for a crime is
not impaired by the manner in which he is brought within a court's
jurisdiction. This rule, known as the Ker-Frisbie doctrine,21 was first
enunciated by the Supreme Court in 1886 in Ker v. Illinois.
22
18. Anderson, Fighting the International Drug War, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1991, at 24-25.
19. Moss, supra note 1, at 24. "With few court decisions standing in the way of U.S.
seizures of foreign criminal suspects, public officials are encouraged to become 'officially li-
censed kidnappers.'" Id. (quoting DePaul College of Law Professor, M. Cherif Bassiouni).
There is also an increasing number of published opinions by federal district courts on such
abductions. Id.; see also Abramovsky & Eagle, supra note 1, at 52-55. For published opinions,
see infra notes 110-12.
20. See Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
21. Id.; Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952). The Ker-Frisbie doctrine is based on the
maxim mala captus bene detentus which allows national courts to "assert in personam jurisdic-
tion without inquiring into the means by which the presence of the defendant was secured."
M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 15, at 190.
22. 119 U.S. 436 (1886). The Ker decision can be traced to two English cases: Regina v.
Sattler, 169 Eng. Rep. 111 (1858) (where the court held that offenses committed by foreigners
on British vessels on the high seas may be tried by any court within whose jurisdiction the
offender is found, and it did not have to decide on the illegality of the original arrest); and Ex
parte Susannah Scott, 109 Eng. Rep. 166 (1829) (where the accused was arrested in Brussels by
a British police officer and forcibly returned to stand trial in England, and the court held that
it could not inquire into the circumstances of the arrest or the accused's return to the English
jurisdiction).
Ker is the seminal case in this area of the law, and is cited internationally for upholding
Am--
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In Ker, a resident of Peru was indicted by an Illinois grand jury
on charges of larceny and embezzlement. 23 The Governor of Illinois
requested the United States President to invoke the extradition treaty
between the United States and Peru.24 In accordance with the re-
quest, a warrant was issued authorizing a Pinkerton agent to assume
custody of Ker in Peru. Rather than serving the warrant, or request-
ing custody from the Peruvian authorities, the agent forcibly abducted
Ker and placed him aboard an American vessel bound for the United
States.25 Ker was then taken to Illinois where he was tried and con-
victed. 26 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court held that Ker
could be tried regardless of the methods by which personal jurisdic-
tion had been obtained over him.27 The Court went on to explain that
"due process of law ... is complied with when the party is regularly
indicted[,] ... has a trial according to the forms and modes prescribed
for such trials, and when, in that trial and proceedings, he is deprived
of no rights to which he is lawfully entitled.
'28
The Supreme Court again addressed this issue in 1952, in Frisbie
v. Collins.29 In Frisbie, a Michigan state prisoner filed a petition for
habeas corpus alleging that police officers had forcibly abducted him
from Illinois and taken him to Michigan. 30 The prisoner claimed that
his trial and subsequent conviction in Michigan was void on due pro-
cess grounds because he had been illegally kidnapped, handcuffed,
the exercise of jurisdiction over defendants who have been illegally abducted or irregularly
rendered in other jurisdictions. See United States v. Cordero, 668 F.2d 32, 36 (5th Cir. 1981)
(citing Ex parte Elliot, 1 All E.R. 373 (K.B. 1949) (Eng.)); Geldof v. Muelemeester and Stef-
fen, 31 I.L.R. 385 (cour de cassation 1961) (Belg.); Attorney General v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5
(Dist. Jerusalem 1961), aff'd 36 J.L.R. 277 (S. Ct. 1962 Isr.). But see Case of Nollet, 18
Journal Du Droit International 1188 (cour d'appel de Douri 1891) and In re Jolis, Ann. Dig.
191 (No. 77) (Tribunal correctionnel d'avesnes 1933) (Fr.). Ker arose out of a traditional extra-
dition where the United States' attempt to comply with normal extradition processes was frus-
trated by political unrest in Peru which made the proper service of the extradition warrant
impossible. Faced with this obstruction of their efforts, the United States agents resorted to an
illegal abduction.
23. 119 U.S. at 437.
24. Id. at 438.
25. Id. Ker made no claim and presented no evidence that he had been tortured by either
United States or Peruvian law enforcement officials. Id.
26. Id. at 437, 439.
27. Id. at 443-44.
28. Ker, 119 U.S. at 440. At the time Ker was decided, the fourteenth amendment was
less than 20 years old. U.S. CONSr. amend. XIV.
29. 342 U.S. at 519.
30. Id. at 520.
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and blackjacked 3' in Illinois by Michigan law enforcement officers. 32
The Supreme Court rejected his claim by reaffirming the Ker holding.
The Court reasoned that the power of a court to try a person for a
crime is not diminished because the person was brought within the
court's jurisdiction by a forcible abduction. 33 Justice Black, writing
for the Court, stated: "[D]ue process of law is satisfied when one pres-
ent in court is convicted of crime after having been fairly apprised of
the charges against him and after a fair trial in accordance with con-
stitutional procedural safeguards. '
34
Thus, the Ker-Frisbie doctrine allows law enforcement officers to
obtain jurisdiction through indisputably illegal acts even though it
may "reward police brutality and lawlessness in some cases."35 For
many years, the doctrine has been cited as authorizing law enforce-
ment misconduct as long as the defendant receives a fair trial upon his
return to the United States. 36
III. THE TOSCANINO EXCEPTION TO THE KER-FRISBIE DOCTRINE
In United States v. Toscanino,37 the Second Circuit acknowledged
the Ker-Frisbie doctrine's potential to countenance brutal police mis-
conduct during abduction and carved out an exception to the rule.
The court held that recently expanded concepts of due process require
a court to divest itself of jurisdiction over the defendant where juris-
diction has been acquired as the result of the government's improper
deprivation of the accused's constitutional rights. 38
In Toscanino, the court was faced with an extreme example of
governmental misconduct. Francisco Toscanino, an Italian citizen,
was convicted of conspiracy to import and distribute narcotics.3 9
Toscanino argued that the district court proceedings against him were
void because personal jurisdiction over him had been unlawfully ac-
31. "Blackjacked" is defined as being beaten with a short, leather-covered club. THE
RANDOM HOUSE DIcIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 154 (1973).
32. Frisbie, 342 U.S. at 520.
33. Id. at 522.
34. Id.
35. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 272 (2d Cir. 1974).
36. See M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 15, at 204-05.
37. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
38. Id. at 275. The court stated that this conclusion was merely "an extension of the
well-recognized power of federal courts in the civil context to decline to exercise jurisdiction
over a defendant whose presence has been secured by force or fraud." Id.
39. Id. at 268-69.
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quired.4° He claimed he was lured from his home in Montevideo,
Uruguay by a phone call from a Montevideo police officer allegedly
acting as a paid agent of the United States government.41 When Tos-
canino and his pregnant wife went to the place designated in the
phone call, seven men attacked him, knocked him unconscious with a
gun, and threw him into a car.42 Bound and blindfolded, Toscanino
was driven to the Uruguay-Brazil border where a group of Brazilians,
acting on behalf of United States agents, took him into custody. The
Brazilians transported Toscanino to Porto Alegre where he was held
incommunicado for eleven hours and deprived of all food and water. 43
Toscanino was then taken to Brasilia where he was incessantly
tortured and interrogated for seventeen days with the participation of
a United States Bureau of Narcotics agent.44 During this period, Tos-
canino was given intravenous nourishment in amounts sufficient only
to keep him alive. Toscanino claimed he was forced to walk up and
down a hallway for seven or eight hours at a time. He was kicked,
beaten, and pinched with metal pliers. Agents flushed alcohol into his
eyes and nose, and forced other fluids into his anal passage. The ab-
ductors administered electric shocks by attaching electrodes to Tos-
canino's earlobes, toes, and genitals.45 All of the alleged torture was
administered in a sadistic manner, but in a way that would avoid scar-
ring.46 After nineteen days of interrogation, Toscanino awoke in the
United States where he was arrested and brought to a United States
Attorney.47 The United States government neither confirmed nor de-
nied the allegations. Instead, the government contended that the alle-
gations were immaterial to the district court's power to proceed under
the Ker-Frisbie doctrine.
4
On appeal, the Second Circuit questioned the continuing validity
of the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, and held that the district court should
have given Toscanino an opportunity to substantiate his allegations at
an evidentiary hearing. 49 If Toscanino could prove the allegations of
40. Id.
41. Id. at 269.
42. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 269.
43. Id. at 270.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. Any of the allegations standing alone would constitute torture under customary
international law.
47. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 270.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 281.
878 [Vol. 13:871
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torture, the Constitution would require the court to divest itself of
jurisdiction.5 0 The court based its deviation from the established Ker-
Frisbie doctrine on the "Constitutional Revolution," 5' which substan-
tially expanded the notion of due process since the Supreme Court's
decision in Frisbie.
52
The court also cited widespread judicial and academic criticisms
of the Ker-Frisbie rule.5 3 The court held that the rule "cannot be rec-
onciled with the Supreme Court's expansion of the concept of due
process,"' 54 and that "due process... now require[s] a court to divest
itself of jurisdiction over the person of a defendant where it has been
acquired as the result of the government's deliberate, unnecessary and
unreasonable invasion of the accused's constitutional rights." 55
However, the majority and concurring opinions disagreed on the
constitutional basis for the decision. 56 Judge Mansfield grounded his
majority opinion on an extension of the fourth amendment's exclu-
sionary rule. He reasoned that Ker and Frisbie no longer controlled
because they were inconsistent with recent judicial censure of govern-
ment illegality in law enforcement. 57 Rather, due process extends be-
yond the guarantee of a fair trial-it encompasses the pretrial
treatment of the defendant in order to deter police misconduct and
deny the government the fruits of its lawlessness. Judge Mansfield
wrote:
[W]e must be guided by the underlying principle that the govern-
ment should be denied the right to exploit its own illegal conduct,
... and when an accused is kidnapped and forcibly brought within
50. Id. For the procedural mechanisms to prove allegations of abduction and torture, see
infra text accompanying notes 296-321.
51. See Griswold, The Due Process Revolution and Confrontation, 119 U. PA. L. REV.
711 (1971).
52. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 272 (citing United States v. Russell, 441 U.S. 418, 430-31
(1973); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Wong
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961)).
53. For academic criticism, the court cited Pitler, "The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree,"
Revisited and Shepardized, 56 CAL. L. REv. 579, 600 (1968); Scott, Criminal Jurisdiction of a
State Over a Defendant Based Upon Presence Secured by Force or Fraud, 37 MINN. L. REV. 91,
102, 107 (1953); Allen, Due Process and State Criminal Procedure: Another Look, 48 Nw. U.L.
REV. 16, 27-28 (1953). For judicial criticism, see United States v. Edmons, 432 F.2d 577, 583
(2d Cir. 1970); Virgin Islands v. Ortiz, 427 F.2d 1043, 1045 n.2 (3d Cir. 1970).
54. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 275.
55. Id.
56. The three judges who sat for the Second Circuit on Toscanino's appeal were Circuit
Judges Mansfield, Anderson, and Oakes. Judge Mansfield wrote the majority opinion and
Judge Anderson wrote a concurring opinion. Id. at 268.
57. Id. at 275; see supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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the jurisdiction, the court's acquisition of power over his person
represents the fruits of the government's exploitation of its own
misconduct. Having unlawfully seized the defendant in violation
of the Fourth Amendment.... the government should as a matter
of fundamental fairness be obligated to return him to his status quo
ante. Faced with a conflict between the two concepts of Due Pro-
cess, the one being the restricted version found in Ker-Frisbie and
the other the expanded and enlightened interpretation expressed in
more recent decisions of the Supreme Court, we are persuaded that
to the extent that the two are in conflict, the Ker-Frisbie version
should yield.
58
The majority in Toscanino also relied on the Supreme Court's
fifth amendment substantive due process analysis in Rochin v. Califor-
nia,5 9 in which the Supreme Court set aside a state court conviction
based on evidence obtained through police misconduct. In Rochin,
police officers illegally entered the home of a suspected narcotics
dealer.6 0 The defendant swallowed two capsules of morphine despite
the officers' attempts to extract the capsules by force.6' The officers
then handcuffed the defendant and took him to a hospital where they
directed a doctor to force "an emetic solution through a tube into [the
defendant's] stomach against his will."'62 The solution induced vomit-
ing and the officers seized the morphine. The Supreme Court reversed
the resulting conviction, holding that forcing the defendant to vomit
to obtain evidence against him was undeniably pretrial misconduct
that offended the "canons of decency and fairness which express the
notions of justice of English-speaking peoples even toward those
charged with the most heinous offenses." 63 The Toscanino court held
that the alleged treatment of Toscanino by United States Marshals
constituted this type of conduct which is repulsive to human dignity
and denies the fundamental fairness insured by due process of law.64
Judge Anderson wrote a concurring opinion stating that the deci-
58. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 275. Judge Mansfield further stated, "Society is the ultimate
loser when, in order to convict the guilty, it uses methods that lead to decreased respect for the
law." Id at 274.
59. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
60. Id. at 166.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 169.
64. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 267. Judge Mansfield also noted that the court could have
reached the same result through an exercise of the court's supervisory power. Id at 276. This
power could be invoked by the circuit court "to prevent the district courts from themselves
becoming 'accomplices in the willful disobedience of the law.' "Id (citing McNabb v. United
[Vol. 13:871
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sion could have been decided on due process grounds alone, and with-
out calling into question the Ker-Frisbie doctrine.65 He stated that
"[t]he courts of this country... no longer completely disregard the
behavior of our police agents when they are operating outside the na-
tional boundaries." 66 In this way, the court could have distinguished
Toscanino from other illegal abduction cases, based on the extreme
nature of the torture directly perpetrated by United States officers.
Within months of the Toscanino decision, Judge Anderson's analysis
was adopted as the law of the Second Circuit.
IV. NARROWING OF THE TosCANINo EXCEPTION TO EGREGIOUS
MISCONDUCT BY UNITED STATES LAW ENFORCEMENT
Toscanino's prohibition of all illegality in international arrest and
detention raised many questions about the breadth and application of
these new constitutional standards.67 Read broadly, Toscanino
divested courts of jurisdiction over defendants where there was any
unnecessary and deliberate violation of an arrestee's constitutional
rights. 68 Shortly after Toscanino, the Second Circuit clarified its hold-
ing, and limited the exception to acts of brutality that shock the
conscience.
A. Lujan Limits the Toscanino Exception to
Acts of Extreme Brutality
Only six months after the decision in Toscanino, the Second Cir-
cuit reexamined the issue of police illegality during pretrial detention
States, 318 U.S. 332, 345 (1943)). For a discussion of supervisory powers, see infra notes 180-
200 and accompanying text.
Judge Mansfield held alternatively that in abducting Toscanino, the United States govern-
ment violated its obligations under the United Nations Charter and the Charter of the Organi-
zation of American States by encroaching upon the sovereignty or territorial integrity of
Uruguay. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 277. For a discussion on enforcing international agreements
in United States courts, see infra notes 201-35 and accompanying text.
65. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 281 (Anderson J., concurring).
66. Id.
67. See generally Note, Constitutional Law-Criminal Law-A Federal Court Lacks Juris-
diction Over a Criminal Defendant Brought Into the District by Forceable Abduction: The
Fourth Amendment Protects an Alien Residing Abroad Against Unreasonable Searches and
Seizures Conducted by American Agents-United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir.
1974), 86 HARV. L. REV. 813 (1975); Evans, Jurisdiction-Forcible Abduction-Ker-Frisbee
Rule-Treaties-Extradition-United States v. Toscanino, 500 F2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974), 69 AM. J.
Ir'L L. 406 (1975); Note, Criminal Law-Apprehension Abroad ofAlien Criminal Defendant in
Violation of Fourth Amendment Ousts Trial Court of Jurisdiction to Hear Charges-Second Cir-
cuit Restricts Ker-Frisbie Rule, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 634 (1975).
68. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 275 (2d Cir. 1974).
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or arrest, in Ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler.69 In that case, the United States
government procured an indictment against Lujan, a citizen of Argen-
tina, for conspiracy to import and distribute heroin. 70 A magistrate
issued an arrest warrant directing the Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion ("DEA") or the United States Marshal to bring him before the
district court for the Eastern District of New York.71 Lujan claimed
he was lured into Bolivia from Argentina by a United States agent
who hired him to fly the agent to Bolivia. Upon their arrival in Bo-
livia, local police arrested Lujan, allegedly acting as paid agents of the
United States.72 Lujan asserted that he was held incommunicado for
six days, placed on a plane bound for the United States, and immedi-
ately arrested upon his arrival in New York.
73
Although Lujan claimed the government had forcibly removed
him from a foreign country without filing charges in that country and
without going through formal extradition procedures, 74 he did not
claim that he had been subjected to any physical torture like that al-
leged in the Toscanino case.75 Writing for the court, Judge Kaufmann
explained that Toscanino did not proscribe all illegal abductions
abroad. He stated:
[I]n recognizing that Ker and Frisbie no longer provided a carte
blanche to government agents bringing defendants from abroad to
the United States by the use of torture, brutality and similar outra-
geous conduct, [in Toscanino] we did not intend to suggest that any
irregularity in the circumstances of a defendant's arrival in the ju-
risdiction would vitiate the proceedings of the criminal court....
It requires little argument to show that the government conduct of
which [Lujan] complains pales by comparison with that alleged by
Toscanino. Lacking from Lujan's petition is any allegation of that
complex of shocking governmental conduct sufficient to convert an
abduction which is simply illegal into one which sinks to a viola-
69. 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975). Judges Oakes and Anderson who participated in the
Toscanino decision, were joined on the Second Circuit panel by Chief Judge Kaufman. Id at
63 n.1.





74. Lujan, 510 F.2d at 63. At the time of this case, the United States and Bolivia were
signatories to an extradition treaty. Treaty of Extradition, Apr. 21, 1900, United States-Bo-
livia, 32 Stat. 1857, T.S. No. 399, 5 Bevan 735 (entered into force Jan. 22, 1902).
75. Lujan, 510 F.2d at 66.
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tion of due process. 76
Judge Anderson, who had based his concurrence in Toscanino on the
due process standard of Rochin, concurred again in Lujan, explaining
that Toscanino "rest[ed] solely and exclusively upon the use of torture
and other cruel and inhuman treatment." 77 Judge Anderson stated
that the majority of the court "rejected the proposition that a kidnap-
ping of a foreign national from his own or another nation and his
forcible delivery into the United States against his will, but without
torture, would itself violate due process. ' 78
The holding in Lujan suggests that kidnapping or abduction is
permissible if there is no extreme physical or mental abuse of the de-
fendant that "shocks the conscience." However, this holding necessi-
tates a judicial interpretation in each case of the quantum of physical
or mental abuse that distinguishes constitutionally proper abductions
from those that violate the Constitution because of their unacceptably
cruel and inhumane treatment of the defendant. This effectively fore-
closed Judge Mansfield's fourth amendment-based analysis which re-
quired the exclusion of the person of the illegally abducted defendant
as the fruit of an illegal arrest.79
B. Lira Further Limits the Toscanino Exception to Egregious
Torture Directly Perpetrated by the United States
Government
Shortly after the decision in Lujan, the Second Circuit con-
fronted another abduction case. In United States v. Lira,80 the Chil-
ean Police, at the request of the DEA, arrested Rafael Lira,81 a
Chilean citizen.8 2 The Chilean authorities questioned Lira regarding
the whereabouts of a co-conspirator, and brutally tortured him over a
period of several weeks. 83 Lira testified that he was blindfolded,
76. Id. at 65-66.
77. Id. at 69 (Anderson, J., concurring).
78. Id. In addition, Lujan clarified the Second Circuit's position on violations of interna-
tional law implied in Toscanino. Lujan held that an abducted individual has no right to con-
test the legality of the abduction absent an official protest by the government of the country
from which the individual was obtained. Id. at 68.
79. See Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 275.
80, 515 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 847 (1975).
81. Lira's true name is Rafael Mellafe. Id. at 69.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 69-70. Lira alleged that the Chilean Police had arrested him at the home of his
common law wife in Santiago, and had taken him to a local police station where he was tor-
tured and interrogated. After four days at the police station, the police took him to the Chil-
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beaten, strapped nude to a box-spring, and tortured with electric
shocks.s4 Lira claimed that during this ordeal he heard someone
speaking English, but was unable to identify the speaker.8 5 The cap-
tors photographed Lira and told him that "some Americans were
waiting for his photograph. '8 6 Lira allegedly saw two United States
DEA agents in the hallway of the Chilean prosecutor's office, who
were identified to him as agents Cecil and Frangulis.8 7 The Chileans
eventually placed him on a plane to New York, accompanied by eight
Chilean Police officers and DEA agent Cecil. 88
Although Lira's story of torture and physical abuse sounded very
much like Toscanino's, the court held that, because the defendant
could not prove overt United States participation in Lira's ordeal, the
district court could properly retain jurisdiction over him.8 9 Judge
Mansfield stated, "[T]he record fails to reveal any substantial evi-
dence that Chilean police were acting as agents of the United States in
arresting or mistreating [Lira] or that United States representatives
were aware of such misconduct." 9°
Counsel for Lira argued that the United States should be held
vicariously liable for the misconduct, since the DEA set the arrest
procedures in motion by its request to the Chilean officials. 91 The
court rejected the argument, stating:
Unlike Toscanino, where the defendant was kidnapped from Uru-
guay in defiance of the laws of the country, here the Government
merely asked the Chilean Government to arrest and expel [Lira] in
accord with its own procedures.... The DEA can hardly be ex-
ean Naval Prison, where he was tortured further and beaten. Approximately two months after
his arrest, the authorities forced him to sign a decree expelling him from Chile, and sent him
on a plane to New York. Id.
84. Id at 69.
85. Lira, 515 F.2d at 69.
86. Id.
87. Id. The two men were later identified as Special Agents Charles Cecil and George
Frangulis of the DEA. I,
88. Id. at 70.
89. Id. at 70-71. The court acknowledged that DEA agents were linked to the defend-
ant's arrest and torture in several ways: 1) the DEA agents initially requested Lira's arrest and
return to the United States; 2) during his torture in Santiago, Lira heard English being spo-
ken, but could not identify the speakers; 3) when photographed in Chile, Lira was told that
United States agents were awaiting prints of his photograph; and 4) while he was being inter-
rogated, Lira saw two United States agents in the hallway outside of the Chilean prosecutor's
office, one of whom later accompanied him on his flight to New York. When later questioned,
DEA agent Cecil denied ever having been at the Chilean prosecutor's office. Id. at 71.
90. Lira, 515 F.2d at 70-71.
91. Id. at 71.
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pected to monitor the conduct of representatives of each foreign
government to assure that a request for extradition or expulsion is
carried out in accordance with American constitutional stan-
dards.... Since our Government' has no control over the foreign
police, extension of Toscanino to the present case would serve no
purpose.
92
The court of appeals noted that it has long been recognized that for-
eign authorities are not judged by standards of the United States Con-
stitution.93 Furthermore, an exclusionary remedy would not serve its
stated purpose if it was used to conform the conduct of foreign
agents.
94
Taking Lujan and Lira together, a kidnapping orchestrated by
United States agents without torture is proper, and a kidnapping with
torture, absent proof of a direct United States role in the torture, is
also acceptable. Thus, the broad prohibition of illegal abduction pro-
posed by Judge Mansfield in Toscanino has been completely rejected.
Although this prohibition of illegal arrest was based on sound exten-
sions of established constitutional doctrine, adoption of the exclusion-
ary remedy for all technically illegal arrests was not acceptable to
most circuit courts. Courts and commentators claim that such a pol-
icy would unnecessarily frustrate law enforcement activities, espe-
cially given the slow and cumbersome extradition process.
95
Despite this significant narrowing, Toscanino was a triumph of
United States jurisprudence. Toscanino endowed the courts with the
92. I The evidence in Lira created a strong inference that United States agents were at
least aware that Lira had been physically abused. The United States withholds economic aid
from countries that fail to observe international principles of human rights. Nevertheless, the
Lira court countenanced United States acquiescence to such behavior by allowing the govern-
ment to benefit from the heinous interrogation of Lira by Chilean authorities. Such contradic-
tory policies destroy the credibility of the United States' resolve to abolish torture.
93. Id; see Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738, 743 (9th Cir. 1968); cf. Cooley v.
Weinberger, 518 F.2d 1151, 1154-55 (10th Cir. 1975). Judge Oakes, who sat on all three cases
in the Second Circuit's abduction trilogy-Toscanino, Lujan, and Lira-preserved the court's
option to utilize its supervisory powers to divest itself of jurisdiction for extreme misconduct
by law enforcement officials. He stated:
[R]egardless of the abstract doctrine Ker and Frisbie are said to stand for, we can
reach a time when in the interest "of establishing and maintaining civilized standards
of procedure and evidence," we may wish to bar jurisdiction in an abduction case as
a matter not of constitutional law but in the exercise of our supervisory power....
To my mind the Government in the laudable interest of stopping the international
drug traffic is by these repeated abductions inviting exercise of that supervisory
power in the interests of the greater good of preserving respect for law.
Lira, 515 F.2d at 72-73 (Oakes, J., concurring).
94. Lira, 515 F.2d at 71.
95. See Abramovsky & Eagle, supra note 1.
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means to inquire into allegations of police misconduct and differenti-
ate between a mere technically illegal arrest, which Ker-Frisbie toler-
ated, and brutal and inhuman mistreatment by police officers, which
neither Ker nor Frisbie addressed.96
C. Affirmation of Ker-Frisbie for Abduction and Further Decline
of the Toscanino Exception for Outrageous Conduct
Lujan and Lira limited the Toscanino exception to cases where
defendants alleged that United States agents were directly involved
with the outrageous and shocking mistreatment of pretrial detainees.
97
The majority of circuit courts adopted this abridgement of Tos-
canino's fourth amendment analysis, limiting the exception to the due
process prohibition of torture, brutality, and outrageous conduct. 98
Moreover, subsequent Supreme Court decisions seem to be in accord
with this limitation and have retained the Ker-Frisbie rule in cases of
illegal arrest without torture. In United States v. Crews,99 the
Supreme Court rejected the defendant's claim of immunity from pros-
ecution based on his illegal arrest. I°° The Court stated, "An illegal
arrest without more, has never been viewed as a bar to subsequent
prosecution, nor as a defense to a valid conviction."'' 0 1 Similarly, in
96. Arguably, neither Ker nor Frisbie authorized courts to overlook the torture of an
abductee abroad, despite the fact that the doctrine is widely cited as authorizing any pretrial
misconduct so long as the defendant receives a fair trial. M.C. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL
EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 125 (1974). In Ker, no torture or brutality was
alleged by the defendant. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886). Likewise, Frisbie was not an
international case and the Court did not discuss whether the defendant's blackjacking was
necessary for his capture or detainment. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
The Ker-Frisbie doctrine may be appropriate for illegal abduction absent any physical or
mental abuse. Even though it may erode voluntary observance of international law, this rule is
expedient for nations, especially when formal channels of extradition are unavailable or intol-
erably delayed. However, extreme physical or mental abuse during abduction or detention is
void of any reasonable justification.
97. Lira, 515 F.2d at 71; Lujan, 510 F.2d at 65.
98. See infra notes 110-12.
99. 445 U.S. 463 (1980).
100. Id. at 547.
101. Id. (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119 (1975)). However, in Crews, the de-
fendant was not subjected to brutality or physical abuse by law enforcement. Moreover, the
persuasive authority of Crews, as confirming the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, is questionable. In
Crews, the defendant claimed that an in-court identification was inadmissible because his pres-
ence in the courtroom was the product of an illegal arrest. Because his person constituted the
identification evidence in court, he argued that his presence in court should be suppressed.
The court avoided addressing this unusual situation by saying that a prior pretrial identifica-
tion was sufficient for conviction. Thus, Crews presented a distinguishable set of facts and does
not support a broad application of the Ker-Frisbie doctrine to abduction and torture.
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Gerstein v. Pugh,10 2 the Court stated, "[N]or do we retreat from the
established [Ker-Frisbie] rule that illegal arrest or detention does not
void a subsequent conviction."'' 03
Given judicial deference to extra-legal means of arrest, the ab-
duction of aliens from abroad by United States law enforcement of-
ficers has proliferated and become commonplace. °4 Professor
Bassiouni estimates that "as many as one or two persons daily" are
forcibly abducted and brought to the United States across the Mexi-
can border to face criminal charges.'0 5 The circumvention of formal
extradition procedures has become a matter of course in many situa-
tions.1 6 In June 1989, the office of the Legal Counsel of the United
States Justice Department issued a confidential opinion authorizing
the abduction of persons abroad to face criminal charges in the
United States. 0 7 This policy statement indicates a new willingness by
the executive branch to endorse abduction as an acceptable procedure
for law enforcement' 08 However, this increased tolerance for the use
102. 420 U.S. 103, 119 (1975).
103. Id. Circuit courts have also cited the following Supreme Court cases generally af-
firming the Ker-Frisbie doctrine: I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1039-40 (1984) and
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 485 (1976), cited in Matta-Ballasteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255,
260 (7th Cir. 1990).
104. "That United States law enforcement officers roam around the world (particularly the
Third World) making or assisting in arrests and other forms of seizure going beyond intelli-
gence gathering is apparent." Lowenfeld, US. Law Enforcement Abroad: The Constitution
and International Law, Continued, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 481 (1990).
105. See Moss, supra note 1.
106. A detrimental side-effect of this reliance on abduction is that it relieves the pressures
on government to streamline extradition laws and procedures. A number of extradition re-
form bills have been introduced before the Senate and House of Representatives since 1981.
M.C. BASsIoUNI, supra note 15, at 43. The Extradition Reform Act was introduced to "mod-
ernize the statutory provisions relating to international extradition." S. 1639, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess., 127 CONG. REC. S 10,032 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1981). The Senate bill was originally intro-
duced as part of proposed legislation to amend the federal criminal code. See S. 1630, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. S9916 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1981). The House of Representa-
tives also considered an act to revise United States extradition law and procedure, in the Extra-
dition Reform Act of 1981. For a thorough discussion of proposed legislative reform, see
Bassiouni, Extradition Reform Legislation in the United States: 1981-1983, 17 AKRON L. REV.
495 (1984).
Today, "the [Bush] administration seems to be intent on pursuing bilateral treaties em-
bodying whatever provisions [can] be negotiated that would supplement or alter existing statu-
tory provisions." M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 15, at 54. However, this policy leads to neither
uniformity nor consistency in the extradition law and practice of the United States. Id.
107. The opinion was entitled "Authority of the FBI to Override Customary or Other
International Law in the Course of Extraterritorial Law Enforcement Activities." See
Lowenfeld, supra note 104, at 484 n.207. The opinion was never released to the public. Id. at
484-85.
108. The 1989 Department of Justice opinion superseded a 1980 opinion authored by John
Loy. LA. Int'l & Comp. L.J. [Vol. 13:871
of abductions undermines respect for the sovereignty of nations and
world order.' °9
In theory, the Toscanino exception still prescribes the exclusion-
ary remedy for incidents of police brutality and outrageous conduct
based on violations of the fifth amendment's due process clause.
However, courts have imposed an extremely high threshold of outra-
geous conduct necessary to invoke the exclusionary remedy. Further-
more, courts have refused to apply the exclusionary rule unless
United States police officers or agents played a substantial role or par-
ticipated in the torture. Consequently, few courts have granted evi-
dentiary hearings to consider police misconduct. 110
Even where defendants have secured hearings on pretrial brutal-
ity, courts have rejected their claims and retained jurisdiction. In
cases where defendants were successful in substantiating torture offen-
sive to due process, courts have held, without exception, that there
was insufficient United States involvement in the misconduct to in-
yoke constitutional protections."' On the other hand, where United
States involvement was obvious and unquestionable, courts have con-
sistently held that the police misconduct did not rise to a sufficiently
Harmon. Extraterritorial Apprehension by the FBI, 4 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 543 (1980).
Assistant Attorney General William P. Barr claimed the 1980 opinion had expressed the view
that the United States, as a sovereign, had no authority under its own laws to conduct law
enforcement in another country without that country's consent. Lowenfeld, supra note 104, at
485.
Under our constitutional system, the executive and legislative branches, acting within
the scope of their respective authority, may take or direct actions which depart from
customary international law. At least as respects our domestic law, such actions
constitute "controlling executive or legislative act[s]" that supplant legal norms
otherwise furnished by customary international law.
The Legality as a Matter of Domestic Law of Extraterritorial Law Enforcement Activities that
Depart from International Law: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional
Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong., 3d Sess. 4-5 (1989) (statement of
Barr).
109. Bassiouni, Unlawful Seizures and Irregular Rendition Devices as Alternatives to Extra-
dition, VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L LAW, 28, 29, 64-65 (1973). The executive branch has yet to
openly endorse brutality as a means of obtaining fugitives or obtaining information from them.
As remote as such a possibility seemed only a decade ago, such a pronouncement could be
forthcoming, given the current makeup of the Supreme Court and the continuing escalation of
the war on drugs. Consider the recent case of Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991),
which held that the admission of a coerced confession was harmless error.
110. United States v. Cordero, 668 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1981); United States v. Orsini, 424 F.
Supp. 229 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); United States v. Degollado, 696 F. Supp. 1136 (S.D.Tex. 1988).
111. See Lowenfeld, supra note 104, at 489; United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.
1975); United States v. Lopez, 542 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Lara, 539 F.2d
495 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Marzano, 537 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Degollado, 696 F. Supp. 1136 (S.D. Tex. 1988).
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outrageous level to warrant divestiture of jurisdiction. 12 "The read-
ing of [these] decisions gives the unescapable feeling that courts reach
a judgment on the criminality of the accused and then decide as to
how to avoid applying a legal rule that would negate criminal jurisdic-
tion and thus allow the [abductee] to go free." 1 3 For all practical
purposes, the judiciary has almost completely retreated from the Tos-
canino exception, even with respect to heinous acts of torture.
D. The Seventh Circuit Has Rejected the Toscanino
Exception Altogether
Several circuit courts have questioned the continued validity of
the Toscanino exception altogether. "4 For example, in the recent case
Matta-Ballesteros ex reL Stolar v. Henman, 5 four United States Mar-
shals allegedly kidnapped Juan Ramon Matta-Ballesteros from his
home in Tegulcigalpa, Honduras." 6 The Marshals placed Matta into
a car with a hood over his head and drove to an air base." 7 During
the hour-and-a-half ride, the Marshals allegedly beat and burned
Matta with a stun gun." 8 Upon arriving at the air base, his captors
placed him on a jet bound for the United States. Throughout the
flight, the Marshals beat and shocked Matta on his testicles and
feet. 119 Upon arrival in the United States, Matta was immediately
112. Lujan, 510 F.2d at 62; United States v. Cordero, 668 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1981); United
States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v. Romano, 706 F.2d 370 (2d Cir.
1983); United States v. Herrera, 504 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Postal, 589
F.2d 862, 874 n.17 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Valot, 625 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Darby, 744 F.2d 1508 (1 1th Cir. 1984); United States v. Rosenthal, 793 F.2d
1214 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v. Orsini, 424 F. Supp. 229 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); United
States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 909 (D.D.C. 1988); United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506
(S.D. Fla. 1990); United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
113. See M.C. Bassiouni, supra note 15, at 212.
114. United States v. D'Antoni, 874 F.2d 1214, 1219 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Bontkowski, 865 F.2d 129, 131-32 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Miller, 891 F.2d 1265,
1271 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
115. 697 F. Supp. 1040 (S.D. Ill. 1988), aff'd, 896 F.2d 255 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 111 S.
Ct. 209 (1990).
116. Id. at 1042. Matta was a citizen of Honduras. The four United States Marshals were
accompanied by armed members of the Honduran Special Troops called "Cobras." Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. "The stun gun or 'Taser' is a non-lethal device commonly used to subdue individ-
uals resisting arrest. It sends an electric pulse through the body of the victim causing immobi-
lization, disorientation, loss of balance, and weakness." Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896
F.2d 255, 256 n.2 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 209 (1990) (citing Thomas v. City of Zion,
665 F. Supp. 642, 644 (N.D. Ill. 1987)). The stun gun leaves little or no marks on the body of
the victim. Id.
119. Matta-Ballesteros, 697 F. Supp. at 1042-43.
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transferred to Marion Penitentiary where a physician examined
him.120 The examination revealed abrasions on Matta's head, face,
scalp, neck, arms, feet, and penis, and blistering on his back.121
On habeas review of his conviction, Matta claimed that his forci-
ble abduction and torture violated due process of law and that he was
entitled to an evidentiary hearing to substantiate his allegations of tor-
ture. 122 Further, Matta contended that the district court would be
obligated to divest itself of jurisdiction over his person upon a proper
evidentiary showing of torture.1 23 Relying on the Ker-Frisbie doc-
trine, the court held that despite the egregious conduct of the United
States Marshals, Matta could not challenge jurisdiction as a matter of
law, and therefore was not entitled to a hearing at which he might
establish such a constitutional violation. 124
On appeal,1 25 the Seventh Circuit rejected Toscanino altogether,
claiming it had previously been abandoned by the Fifth Circuit in
United States v. Winter,126 and by the Eleventh Circuit in United
States v. Darby.127 However, the court's claim that these cases aban-
doned Toscanino was inaccurate. In Winter, the Fifth Circuit held
that Toscanino does not deprive United States courts of jurisdiction
over a defendant merely because his or her arrest was executed ille-
gaily beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the arresting agency. 28
However, in that case, the defendants did not allege any brutality or
torture and the court did not address the issue.129 The court simply
120. Id. at 1042.
121. Id. "According to the examining physician, these injuries were consistent with those
which could have been caused by a stun gun." Matta-Ballesteros, 896 F.2d at 256.
122. Matta-Ballesteros, 697 F. Supp. at 1041.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1046.
125. Matta-Ballesteros, 896 F.2d at 263.
126. 509 F.2d 975, 986-88 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975).
127. 744 F.2d 1508, 1531 (1lth Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1100 (1985).
128. Winter, 509 F.2d at 983-88. In Winter, the defendant was arrested by United States
Coast Guard officers for conspiracy to import marijuana on a boat located on the high seas
approximately 35 miles from the coast of Florida and 11.9 miles from the nearest island of the
Bahamas. Id. at 977.
129. Id. at 983-88. The Matta-Ballesteros court misinterpreted a single sentence in the
Fifth Circuit's opinion to make the wild claim that the Winter court completely rejected Tos-
canino. The Winter court stated that
although Ker-Frisbie has been severely criticized, and the Second Circuit, in an ex-
treme case of outrageous governmental conduct of physical and emotional brutality
and indignity, has held, on the basis of post-1960 Due Process decisions, that Ker-
Frisbie bends, in such situations the Supreme Court has not receded from Ker or
Frisbie, and neither has this court.
Winter, 509 F.2d at 986-87. Given that Winter involved a technically illegal arrest and no
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held that "mere errors or the exertion of action by agents beyond the
strict territorial limit does not make the conduct so outrageous as to
invoke these more drastic [Toscanino] remedies."' 30 Subsequent Fifth
Circuit decisions have not addressed the continuing vitality of Tos-
canino as it pertains to torture.1
3'
Similarly, in Darby,132 the validity of the Toscanino exception
with respect to torture was not before the Eleventh Circuit. 33 In that
case, the court rejected the defendant's contention that jurisdiction
should be divested because his mere abduction without torture vio-
lated due process. The court stated that it declined to reverse on the
authority of Toscanino, "since the defendant [did] not allege the sort
of 'cruel, inhuman and outrageous treatment allegedly suffered by
Toscanino.' "'134 However, the court did not "rule[ out the possibility
of a narrow exception to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine for extreme
cases." 1
35
After erroneously disregarding the Toscanino exception for bru-
tal and extreme police misconduct, the Matta-Ballesteros court pro-
ceeded to distort established fifth amendment doctrine. The court
properly stated that the due process clause "protect[s] a pre-trial de-
tainee from excessive force that amounts to punishment."' 136 How-
ever, the court then created the fiction that Matta's torture took place
during his arrest and not during pre-trial detention.137 Consequently,
the court addressed the illegality of Matta's arrest under the broad
fourth amendment application of Toscanino, which was decisively re-
torture, this quote simply states that no court has yet to find a set of Toscanino facts sufficient
to invoke the due process clause.
130. Winter, 509 F.2d at 988. The Winter court relied on previous Fifth Circuit cases,
including United States v. Herrera, 504 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1974), and United States v. Herrera,
507 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1975). These cases involved challenges to United States jurisdiction "by
reason of the failure of the United States to follow the orderly processes of extradition under
the treaty between the United States and Peru." Winter, 509 F.2d at 987.
131. See, e.g., United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 874 n.17 (5th Cir. 1979). "We need
not explore the issue of Toscanino's continuing validity here because the record is devoid of
even the slightest evidence of abuse on the part of the Coast Guard." Id.
132. 744 F.2d at 1508.
133. Id. at 1531.
134. Id
135. Id. In United States v. Rosenthal, 793 F.2d 1214, 1232 (11th Cir. 1986), the court
cited Darby, stating, "This court has declined to adopt the Toscanino approach." This state-
ment was mere dicta because Rosenthal had presented no "evidence of conduct which shocks
the conscience." Id.
136. Matta-Ballesteros, 896 F.2d at 261 (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989);
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-39 (1979)).
137. Id.
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jected in prior decisions. 138 In his concurring opinion, Judge Will as-
sailed this blatant fiction, stating that Matta's arrest occurred when he
was initially kidnapped in Tegulcigalpa, Honduras. 139 The majority
responded in a footnote, stating that if Matta's torture had occurred
during his pre-trial detention, the due process clause would prohibit
the outrageous conduct of law enforcement. 140 However, the court
stated that "[t]he remedy . . . for such violations of the due process
clause during pre-trial detention is not the divestiture of jurisdiction,
but rather an injunction or money damages."1 41 Therefore, the court
held that Toscanino no longer retains vitality in the Seventh Circuit,
"at least as far as it creates an exclusionary rule."' 42 Thus, the Sev-
enth Circuit became the first circuit to expressly reject the Toscanino
exception as it applies to torture.
V. THE IMPORTANCE OF TOSCANINO'S EXCLUSIONARY REMEDY
The exclusionary remedy is essential to give effect to Toscanino's
prohibition of torture. The primary purpose of the exclusionary rule
is "to compel respect for.., constitutional guarant[ees] in the only
effective way-by removing the incentive to disregard it.' 4 3 In cases
of abduction and torture, there often is no coerced confession or
tainted evidence which can be suppressed in order to punish and deter
138. Id. After framing the issue in a fourth amendment context, the court rejected Tos-
canino's exclusionary remedy, based on Lujan and Lira. Id at 262-63.
139. Judge Will pointed out that the majority's assumption that Matta's torture occurred
during arrest was erroneous. "An arrest occurs when a reasonable person, in view of all the
circumstances, would believe himself to be under arrest." Matta-Ballesteros, 896 F.2d at 264
(Will, J., concurring) (citing United States v. Boden, 854 F.2d 983, 991-93 (7th Cir. 1988)).
140. Id at 261 n.7.
141. Id.
142. Id at 263.
143. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960). The purposes of exclusionary rem-
edies are to deter illegal police misconduct and, to a lesser extent, to maintain the integrity of
judicial processes. See Pitler, supra note 53; Comment, Jurisdiction Following Illegal Extrater-
ritorial Seizure: International Human Rights Obligation as an Alternative to Constitutional
Stalemate, 54 TEx. L. REv. 1438, 1454 (1976).
The court's aid is denied only when he who seeks it has violated the law in connec-
tion with the very transaction as to which he seeks legal redress. Then aid is denied
despite the defendant's wrong. It is denied in order to maintain respect for law; in
order to promote confidence in the administration of justice; in order to preserve the
judicial process from contamination .... The exclusionary rule has nothing to do
with the fair determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. It represents a
judicially-created device designed to deter disregard for constitutional prohibitions
and give substance to constitutional rights.
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 646 (1961).
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police misconduct. Therefore, the "sole effective remedy"'l  for out-
rageous pretrial treatment that violates due process is to invoke the
Toscanino exception and return the defendant to his or her "status
quo ante."'
145
Although this deterrent is still theoretically available in most cir-
cuits, no United States court has ever exercised the exclusionary rem-
edy and divested itself of jurisdiction based on the egregious pretrial
misconduct of United States law enforcement.146 This reluctance to
exercise the Toscanino exception is partially due to the perception that
the remedy of divesting in personam jurisdiction over a criminal de-
fendant is disproportionate to the benefit derived from deterring ile-
gal conduct by law enforcement officials. For example, in Matta, the
Seventh Circuit found that the use of the exclusionary rule for ex-
treme misconduct during arrest was unwarranted. 147 From the Matta
court's view, "So drastic a step might advance marginally some of the
ends served by exclusionary rules, but it would also increase to an
intolerable degree interference with the public interest in having the
guilty brought to book."'
148
The United States Supreme Court has fostered this apprehension
toward applying exclusionary remedies, noting in dicta that it does
not retreat from the Ker-Frisbie doctrine. 4 9 One court stated, "[T]he
[exclusionary] rule is a needed, but grudgingly taken, medicament; no
more should be swallowed than is needed to combat the disease."' 50
However, without the exclusionary remedy for violations of due pro-
cess, courts could extend the Ker-Frisbie doctrine to its logical ex-
treme and not inquire at all into the pre-trial conduct of law
144. Ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 66 (2d Cir. 1975).
145. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 275 (2d Cir. 1974).
146. Matta-Ballesteros ex reL Stolar v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 261 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 209 (1990).
147. Id at 263. Matta-Ballesteros was an unusual case because the defendant was an es-
caped federal prisoner. Return to his status quo ante would require courts to give up jurisdic-
tion over an individual whose official status quo ante was a prisoner in a federal penitentiary.
Thus, release of Matta even upon the finding of Toscanino facts would have been problematic.
See id at 261 (Will J., concurring).
148. Id. at 262.
149. In Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119 (1975), the Court stated, "[W]e do not retreat
from the established rule that illegal arrest or detention does not void a subsequent convic-
tion." In Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 485 (1976), Chief Justice Burger referred to his dissent
in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
411 (1971) in which he expressed grave concerns about the exclusionary rule and proposed an
alternative legislative remedy. Id. at 485.
150. United States v. Edmons, 432 F.2d 577, 587 (2d Cir. 1970) (Hays J., dissenting).
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enforcement officials. A complete rejection of the exclusionary rule
for violations of due process ignores the Supreme Court's explicit
sanction of the remedy for outrageous conduct enunciated in Rochin
v. California 151 and United States v. Russell.152 Moreover, alternative
remedies, such as injunctive relief and civil damages, are wholly inef-
fective in deterring egregious misconduct by United States agents.
A. Alternative Remedies are Ineffective to Deter Torture
Alternative remedies are available to victims tortured during pre-
trial detention. For example, United States citizens may bring civil
actions in tort against the United States government for acts of physi-
cal violence committed against them. 53 Additionally, aliens may
seek damages for torture committed abroad by United States law en-
forcement agents, by bringing suit in United States courts under the
Alien Tort Claims Act. 154 This Act provides civil redress for aliens
injured by torts committed in violation of international law.
55
However, financial compensation for torture "is certainly not as
effective as the exclusion of jurisdiction" in deterring police miscon-
duct. 56 As a practical matter, the ability of defendants, especially
aliens, to recover damages from the United States government or its
agents abroad is remote. 15 7 In addition, proving torture abroad is in-
herently difficult. More important, however, is the fact that monetary
damages, without an exclusionary remedy, will not compel law en-
forcement officials to consider moral and constitutional imperatives or
to refrain from unnecessary and excessively brutal conduct. The
threat of civil remedies merely requires law enforcement policy-mak-
ers to weigh the risks of paying damage awards against the investiga-
tory advantages of torture and physical coercion.15 8 Such a cynical
151. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
152. 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973).
153. The United States enjoys sovereign immunity and cannot be sued in United States
courts without its consent. However, by enacting the Federal Tort Claims Act, Congress ex-
pressly waived the federal government's sovereign immunity in limited circumstances. 28
U.S.C. § 1346 (1982).
154. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1988).
155. See M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 15, at 245. In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876
(2d Cir. 1980), the Second Circuit held that torture violated international law, and awarded a
Paraguayan torture victim $10 million in damages. Id. at 879.
156. See M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 15, at 236.
157. Comment, Jurisdiction Obtained by Forcible Abduction: Reach Exceeds Due Process
Grasp, 67 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 181, 191 (1976).
158. Such advantages may include expediency in obtaining confessions, the ability to ob-
tain information about other fugitives, and the ability to locate and seize evidence.
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calculation is repulsive to the United States Constitution and cannot
be reconciled with principles of due process of law.
Moreover, individuals responsible for formulating police proce-
dures are largely immune to civil redress. Although individual agents
may be held personally liable for acts of torture, most damage awards
are paid by the United States government. As a result, civil remedies
simply do not discourage policy-makers from utilizing all of the tools
available to them to achieve their objectives, even if those tools di-
rectly or indirectly promote torture.
Other potential remedial deterrents include: prosecution in for-
eign courts or international tribunals for the offense of torture;1 59
criminal sanctions against law enforcement officers; charges of
prosecutorial misconduct; and termination from employment.160 Ar-
guably, the increase in cases involving allegations of torture suggests
that these alternative remedies have not been effective in deterring po-
lice misconduct.
The Bush administration has made an affirmative policy choice
to expand the powers of law enforcement in the war on drugs. Some
commentators claim that "[w]e are reaching the point ... at which
the activities and threats of some drug trafficker may be so serious and
damaging as to give rise to the right to resort to self-defense."
' 161
Although some forms of abduction may be justified in light of the
government's substantial interest in fighting drug trafficking, torture
most certainly cannot be justified. For torture, man's most egregious
crime, exercising the most severe sanction of divesting jurisdiction is
compelling. 162 This argument is particularly persuasive when torture
is perpetrated under the color of law by United States officers. More-
over, barring United States police officers from using improper meth-
ods for securing information and evidence creates an incentive for
using intelligence and imagination in the detection and prosecution of
crimes. 163
159. See Lowenfeld, supra note 104, at 487.
160. See M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 15, at 263.
161. The International Law and Foreign Policy Implications of Nonconsensual Extraterrito-
rial Law Enforcement Activities&" Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional
Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong., 3d Sess. 12 (1989) (statement of
Sofaer) [hereinafter Sofaer Statement].
162. "The torturer has become-like the pirate and slave trader before him--hostis
humani generis, an enemy of all mankind." Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 890.
163. United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68, 72 (1975) (Oakes, J., concurring).
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VI. LEGAL BASES FOR REVITALIZING THE
TOSCANINO EXCEPTION
Toscanino was based on several alternative and ambiguous legal
doctrines. 164 Courts seeking to expand the reach of the Ker-Frisbie
doctrine have seized upon this ambiguity to discredit Toscanino.
165
Thus, it is important to review the legal bases for Toscanino and dis-
cuss the potential of each basis for revitalizing its sanction of exclu-
sion for police brutality.
Included within Toscanino's majority and concurring opinions
and their progeny are no less than four alternative legal bases for di-
vesting courts of jurisdiction for police misconduct. These include:
1) the fourth amendment exclusionary rule utilized by Judge Mans-
field in Toscanino; 2) the courts' supervisory powers as reserved by
Judge Anderson in Toscanino and Judge Oakes in Lira; 3) the viola-
tion of international agreements or international law; and 4) the fifth
amendment due process clause. 166 The present viability and practical-
ity of the first three rationales will be discussed briefly. The due pro-
cess basis will be addressed separately, as part of a proposal for
reform.
A. The Fourth Amendment as the Basis for
the Toscanino Exception
Judge Mansfield's majority opinion in Toscanino relied upon the
application of the fourth amendment's exclusionary rule, as set forth
in Mapp v. Ohio.16 7 He wrote:
[W]hen an accused is kidnapped and forcibly brought within the
jurisdiction, the court's acquisition of power over [the] person rep-
resents the fruits of the government's exploitation of its own mis-
conduct. Having unlawfully seized the defendant in violation of
the Fourth Amendment, which guarantees "the right of the people
164. The Toscanino opinion "has been described as 'vague,' 'enigmatic,' 'overbroad,' and
'inadequate' in analysis." Feinrider, Extraterritorial Abductions. A Newly Developing Interna-
tional Standard, 14 AKRON L. REV. 27, 32 (1980).
165. For example, in Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255 (7th Cir. 1990), the
court stated, "We initially note that Toscanino is of ambiguous constitutional origins. On its
face, Toscanino purports to rely on the due process clause (of either the fifth amendment or the
fourteenth amendment). Yet the Second Circuit relied for support on Mapp v. Ohio, a fourth
amendment case." Id. at 261.
166. Another possible contention is that torture may constitute pre-trial punishment pro-
hibited by the eighth amendment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). This argument was
proposed by the court in Matta-Ballesteros, 896 F.2d at 261.
167. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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to be secure in their persons... against unreasonable... seizures,"
the government should as a matter of fundamental fairness be obli-
gated to return him to his status quo ante.
68
The circuit courts, relying on Supreme Court dicta, have used
two approaches to preclude application of the fourth amendment to
illegal abductions abroad. First, in Lujan, the Second Circuit found
the fourth amendment's "unreasonable search or seizure" standard of
illegality far too broad because it would require the defendant's exclu-
sion in all illegal abductions. 169 Judge Kaufman, writing for the Lu-
jan majority, opined that although Ker and Frisbie
no longer provided a carte blanche to government agents bringing
defendants from abroad to the United States by the use of torture,
brutality and similar outrageous conduct, we did not intend to sug-
gest that any irregularity in the circumstance of a defendant's arri-
val in the jurisdiction would vitiate the proceedings of the criminal
court. 170
Although abandoning Toscanino's application of the fourth
amendment and the corresponding re-entrenchment of the Ker-Frisbie
doctrine for mere illegal arrests countenances some forms of police
misconduct, a rational policy decision seems to exist behind this re-
sult. Extralegal means of arrest are more expedient than formal chan-
nels of extradition,' 71 and are especially attractive given the perceived
threat that drug traffickers pose to the United States.172 Proponents
of abduction argue that applying the fourth amendment to all seizures
of persons abroad would severely frustrate the United States law en-
forcement objective of capturing fugitives. Consequently, abduction
has taken on greater importance in international law enforcement.
168. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 275 (2d Cir. 1974). "An illegal arrest
constitutes a seizure of the person in violation of the Fourth Amendment." See Henry v.
United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100-101 (1959); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 485-88
(1958); Frankel, Concerning Searches and Seizures, 34 HARv. L. REv. 361 (1921).
169. Ex reL Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975).
170. Id at 65. Judge Kaufmann was referring to the Second Circuit's previous holding in
Toscanino.
171. See generally Sakeller, Acquisition of Jurisdiction Over Criminal Defendants by Forci-
ble Abduction: Strict Adherence to Ker-Frisbie Frustrates U.S. Foreign Policy and Obligations, 2
A.S.I.L.S. INT'L L.J. 1 (1978). But see Cardozo, When Extradition Fails, is Abduction the
Solution?, 55 Am. J. INT'L L. 127 (1961). Professor Bassiouni stated that the appropriate
remedy for ineffective extradition procedures "is to make extradition more efficient, not to
subvert it by resorting to unlawful or legally questionable means." See M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra
note 15, at 190.
172. Sofaer Statement, supra note 161.
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Thus, most courts have declined to apply the broad strictures of the
fourth amendment to illegal arrests abroad.
A second fatal blow to the broad application of the fourth
amendment to the illegal arrest of aliens abroad is the recent Supreme
Court holding that the fourth amendment does not apply to searches
and seizures of aliens abroad. 173 The Toscanino court held that aliens
may invoke fourth amendment protection against the conduct of
United States law enforcement officials abroad 174 based on the as-
sumption that the United States Constitution is in force whenever and
wherever its agents act with the authority of the sovereign.175 How-
ever, in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,176 a plurality of the
Supreme Court held that aliens are not part of the community of
"people" to be protected under the fourth amendment. 177 According
to the Court, "[S]ome measure of allegience to the United States...
as evidenced by citizenship or residency, is the quid pro quo for re-
ceiving the privilege of invoking our Bill of Rights as a check on the
extraterritorial actions of United States officials."' 178 Thus, illegally
abducted and tortured aliens will be afforded fourth amendment pro-
tections only when they have sufficient contacts with the United
States to be considered a part of the national community.
79
B. The Supervisory Powers as the Basis for the
Toscanino Exception
The Toscanino court alternatively held that the same result could
have been reached through the exercise of its inherent supervisory
power. 180 The use of federal court supervisory power to divest lower
federal courts of jurisdiction was first defined in United States v. Mc-
Nabb,'8' a case in which the defendants were arrested for suspicion of
murder and held incommunicado for two days. 18 2 During their de-
tention, the defendants were interrogated without the aid of counsel,
and made incriminating statements to the police. There was no find-
173. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990).
174. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 280.
175. Id.
176. 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990).
177. Id. at 1061-62.
178. 856 F.2d at 1236 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
179. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1064.
180. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 276.
181. 318 U.S. 332 (1942). The supervisory powers doctrine was previously suggested by
the Supreme Court in United States v. Weeks, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
182. McNabb, 318 U.S. at 344-45.
[Vol. 13:871
Revitalizing Toscanino
ing that the confessions were involuntary, which would constitute a
violation of the fifth amendment. 8 3 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
ruled that its powers were not limited to determining the constitution-
ality of the conviction under the due process clause.' 84 Instead, the
defendants' confessions were inadmissible because they were obtained
in violation of a federal law requiring prompt arraignment. 85 The
Court grounded its ruling on the federal court's supervisory duty to
"establish and maintain civilized standards of procedure and evi-
dence." 18 6 This doctrine empowers the Court to set standards that
extend beyond the minimal constitutional requirements of due pro-
cess. The Court stated that "[t]he admission of defendant's state-
ments would have undermined the 'integrity of the criminal
proceeding' and made the courts 'accomplices in willful disobedience
of law.' ",17
The Toscanino court was the first to suggest that its supervisory
powers could be applied to reverse the conviction of an alien defen-
dant illegally abducted and physically abused by United States agents
abroad. 8 18 The court stated, "A federal court's criminal process is
abused or degraded where it is executed against a defendant who has
been brought into the territory of the United States by the methods
alleged here." 18 9 In practice, no court has divested itself of jurisdic-
tion over a tortured alien based on the supervisory powers doctrine.
Nevertheless, the doctrine remains a potential tool for deterring
torture by United States law enforcement, and is more likely to be
invoked upon a showing of repeated abuse of the federal court sys-
tem.'90 Given the expanding number of cases involving allegations of
torture at the hands of foreign agents working in joint venture law
enforcement activities with the United States, the courts may some-
day use the supervisory powers to reverse a criminal conviction.
183. Id. at 346-47.
184. Id at 340.
185. Id. at 332.
186. Id. at 340.
187. McNabb, 318 U.S. at 345. The supervisory powers doctrine has subsequently been
invoked to prevent evidence illegally obtained by federal officers from being admitted in state
proceedings, and to prevent the use of evidence illegally obtained by non-federal agents in
federal proceedings. Comment, Jurisdiction Following Illegal Extraterritorial Seizure: Interna-
tional Human Rights Obligation as an Alternative to Constitutional Stalemate, 54 TEX. L. REV.
1439, 1461 (1976) (citing Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956) and Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960)).
188. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 276.
189. Id.
190. United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896, 903 (2d Cir. 1981).
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There are several advantages to basing Toscanino on the supervi-
sory powers doctrine. For example, the remedies available to the
court are not limited to the exclusion of evidence in the fourth amend-
ment context. Rather, they may be "exercised in any manner neces-
sary to remedy abuses of a district court's process," including the
divestiture of in personam jurisdiction over the defendant.1 91 There-
fore, the doctrine may conceivably be used in cases of mere abduction
without torture, if the circumstances of the abduction abuse or de-
grade the federal court. Moreover, since the doctrine may be invoked
by anyone who is brought before a federal court, the supervisory pow-
ers are not subject to the territorial or standing limitations that have
recently been placed upon the fourth amendment by the Supreme
Court in Verdugo.'
92
On the other hand, there are drawbacks to the use of supervisory
powers to deter extreme physical brutality by United States law en-
forcement. First, the standard for applying supervisory powers is in-
herently subjective, and the defendant bears the "heavy burden of
dissuading a court from enforcing a criminal law."' 193 Furthermore, it
is subject to inconsistencies dependent upon foreign policy impera-
tives, rather than principled norms of constitutional and international
law. Courts are likely to engage in a de facto balancing test, gauging
the egregiousness of the police conduct against the heinousness of the
criminal and the danger to society of divesting jurisdiction over
him.194 For example, the acceptable level of brutality for a major
drug trafficker may be very different than that for a petty criminal.
This subjective application of the exclusionary remedy would promote
inconsistency and disrespect for the judiciary.
Second, the supervisory powers do not ban state prosecutions of
individuals illegally seized and brutalized by state officers. 95 Some
international abductions and torture have been perpetrated by state
officers,' 96 although the majority probably have been executed by fed-
eral agents.1
97
191. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 276; cf. Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1955).
192. See generally Comment, International Abduction of Criminal Defendants: Overreach-
ing by the Long Arm of the Law, 14 CoLO. L. REv. 504-08 (1976).
193. Id. at 515.
194. See Comment, supra note 187, at 1456.
195. Id. at 1462.
196. Lawshe v. State, 57 Tex. Crim. 32, 121 S.W. 865 (1909).
197. Federal agents conduct the majority of international abductions due to "the obvious
financial and logistical resources required." See Comment, supra note 187, at 1462.
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Finally, some commentators question the constitutionality of us-
ing the supervisory powers doctrine to divest courts of jurisdiction for
the misconduct of law enforcement officials abroad. 198 The supervi-
sory powers doctrine is based on the federal courts' power to adopt
rules of judicial procedure and evidence to promote the quality of the
judicial process. 199 When the power is not used to improve judicial
procedure, but merely to conform the conduct of the executive
branch, its exercise may be unconstitutional, as an infringement of the
doctrine of separation of powers.200 Nevertheless, the supervisory
powers rationale for an exclusionary remedy has some continuing via-
bility, especially if the due process proscriptions are further limited
and the executive branch continues to expand the scope and intensity
of its war on drugs.
C. International Law as a Basis for the Toscanino Exception
Perhaps the broadest method of revitalizing the Toscanino excep-
tion is to enforce the terms of international agreements in United
States courts. In Toscanino, the Second Circuit held that the alleged
abduction and torture of the defendant violated the charters of the
United Nations and the Organization of American States ("OAS").20 '
These charters require their signatories to respect the territorial sover-
eignties of all member nations. 20 2 The court stated that it is "a long-
standing principle of international law that abductions by one state of
persons located within the territory of another violate the territorial
sovereignty of the second state and are redressable usually by the re-
turn of the person kidnapped.1 2
0 3
The Toscanino court stated that the United States lacked the
power to seize Toscanino in Uruguay because it had voluntarily im-
posed, by agreement, a territorial limitation on its own authority.
2°4
Thus, the Ker-Frisbie doctrine does not apply where a "defendant has
been brought into the district court's jurisdiction by forcible abduc-
tion in violation of a treaty. ' 20 5 The Toscanino court relied on Cook v.
198. Comment, supra note 192, at 505-06.
199. d; see also McNabb, 318 U.S. at 340-41.
200. Comment, supra note 192, at 50506; see also Jill, The Bill of Rights and the Supervi-
sory Power, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 214 (1969).
201. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 277.
202. Both the United States and Uruguay are signatory members of the United Nations
and the Organization of American States.
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United States,206 stating that "the construction of treaties is judicial in
its nature, and courts when called upon to act should be careful to see
that international engagements are faithfully kept and observed...,
[and] that the Executive lives up to our international obligations. '20
7
However, traditional international agreements do not afford indi-
viduals protection against abduction, because individuals have no
rights under these agreements unless they are self-executing.208 Most
international agreements are created by and exist for the benefit of the
sovereign. Absent any objection by the offended state, an individual
has no standing to object to abduction or mistreatment. 20 9 The Tos-
canino court did not refer to any protest by the Uruguayan govern-
ment. Nor did it state how Toscanino obtained standing to challenge
his abduction under international law. 210 Allowing Toscanino to
challenge his abduction without an official protest inferred that the
court believed that the United Nations and the OAS charters con-
ferred rights on individuals to raise violations of the agreements as a
defense to criminal prosecution. 21'
In Lujan,212 the Second Circuit clarified Toscanino with respect
to an individual's ability to invoke international treaties and agree-
ments in United States courts. 21 3 Like Toscanino, Lujan claimed that
his conviction on drug charges should be reversed because his abduc-
tion from Argentina through Bolivia violated the United Nations and
OAS charters. 21 4 The court distinguished Toscanino, claiming that,
while the Uruguayan government had protested Toscanino's abduc-
tion,215 neither Argentina nor Bolivia had protested the abduction of
206. 288 U.S. 102 (1932).
207. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 279; see also Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 906 n. 10
(2d Cir. 1973).
208. See Feinrider, supra note 164, at 34.
209. Id.
210. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 267; see also Feinrider, supra note 164, at 33.
211. See Feinrider, supra note 164, at 34. International treaties and agreements are self-
executing if they have sufficiently precise rules for the rights and duties they create to be en-
forced without subsequent legislative enactments. Davis v. Burke, 179 U.S. 399, 403 (1900);
see also Comment, supra note 192, at 510. For a general discussion on the criteria for deter-
mining whether a treaty is self-executing, see United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862 (5th Cir.
1979). When an international agreement is self-executing, it is the equivalent of an act of
Congress, and may be invoked by individuals in United States courts just like domestic law.
Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924); see generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 154 (1965).
212. 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975).
213. I.
214. Id at 66.
215. Id. at 67. Toscanino alleged that "the Uruguayan government claims that it had no
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Lujan.216 The court found that the provisions proscribing abduction
in those agreements were intended to protect the sovereignty of signa-
tory states, not individual defendants. Therefore, in the absence of an
official protest by the asylum country, no international agreement is
violated and the signatory country is deemed to have consented to the
abduction and waived its sovereign rights:21 7 "[E]ven where a treaty
provides certain benefits for nationals of a particular state . . . it is
traditionally held that 'any rights arising out of such provisions are,
under international law, those of the states and ... individual rights
are only derivative through the states.' "21
Lujan gave foreign nations the discretion to decide when they
will protect their citizens by invoking international agreements or
treaties.2' 9 This type of "conditional self-executing treaty" is ex-
tremely arbitrary and effectively negates Toscanino protections be-
cause foreign agents often participate in abductions and torture along
with United States officials. In the end, this policy of United States
courts "can only encourage disregard for extradition procedures, the
resort to extrajudicial proceedings and abuses by law enforcement
officials." 220
United States courts have almost universally accepted the Second
Circuit's holding in Lujan that an individual's standing to object to
his or her abduction is derivative of the sovereign rights of the nation
from which the individual was taken. 221 Thus, invoking international
prior knowledge of the kidnapping nor did it consent thereto and had indeed condemned this
kind of apprehension as alien to its laws." Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 270.
216. Lujan, 510 F.2d at 67. The Lujan court held that the objection by the asylum state
must be in the form of an official protest with the United States Department of State. Id at 67
n.8.
217. Id. at 67. It may be argued that when a nation agrees to respect the sovereignty of
another nation, and then proceeds to engage in clandestine efforts to abduct that nation's citi-
zens, it has breached its agreement, whether or not that nation officially objects to the abduc-
tion. See Garcia-Mora, Criminal Jurisdiction of a State Over Fugitives Brought From a Foreign
Country by Force or Fraud: A Comparative Study, 32 IND. L.J. 427 (1957); Preuss, Kidnapping
of Fugitives from Justice on Foreign Territory, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 502 (1935).
218. Lujan, 510 F.2d at 67 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 115, comment e (1965)).
219. Feinrider, supra note 164, at 35.
220. BASSIOUNI, supra note 15, at 211.
221. United States v. Cordero, 668 F.2d 32, 37-38 (1st Cir. 1981) (arrest in Panama and
subsequent return to Puerto Rico through Venezuela did not violate the extradition treaties
between the United States and those countries, where neither Panama nor Venezuela objected
to the arrest); United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896, 902 (2d Cir. 1981) ("absent protest or
objection by offended sovereign.... person abducted has... no standing to raise violation of
international law"); Waits v. McGowan, 516 F.2d 203, 208 (3d Cir. 1975) ("[t]he protections
and rights which accrue to the extradited person primarily exist for the benefit of the asylum
1991]
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agreements to divest United States courts of jurisdiction appears to be
foreclosed as a viable basis for avoiding the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, ab-
sent an official protest from the asylum state.
1. Customary International Law
While Toscanino and Lujan addressed abduction as a violation of
the United Nations and OAS charters, they did not address torture as
a violation of international norms of human rights rising to the level
of customary international law. 222 Human rights obligations prohibit-
ing torture, even if considered non-binding because of insufficient im-
plementing legislation, may rise to the level of customary
international law.223 Individuals harmed in violation of customary in-
ternational law have standing to challenge the misconduct in United
States courts.
224
Arguably, torture violates international customary law. All na-
tions condemn torture. 225  Thus, individuals abducted by United
States agents may still be able to raise a Toscanino-type defense based
on customary international law in United States courts. However,
nation"); United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975, 987 (5th Cir. 1975) (personal jurisdiction is
not divested by the "failure of the United States to follow the orderly processes of extradition
under the treaty between the United States and Peru"); United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862,
873 (5th Cir. 1979) (article 6 of the High Seas Convention is not self-executing and therefore
the defendant cannot rely upon a violation of this international law as a defense to the United
States courts' jurisdiction); United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252, 1261 (5th Cir. 1978)
("even if individuals have standing to raise treaty violations, their personal rights are derived
from the rights of a signatory state"); United States v. Herrera, 504 F.2d 859, 860 (5th Cir.
1974) (forcible abduction which allegedly "violated the territorial integrity of Peru contrary to
the United Nations Charter and the Charter of the Organization of American States" does not
divest United States courts ofjurisdiction); United States v. Quesada, 512 F.2d 1043, 1045 (5th
Cir. 1975) (illegal arrest not in conformance with the processes of extradition under the treaty
between the United States and Peru did not divest the district court of jurisdiction); Matta-
Ballasteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 259-60 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 209 (1990)
(arrestee had no standing to challenge violations of treaty in connection with his arrest in
Honduras and transfer to the United States where the government of Honduras did not make
an official protest); United States v. Valot, 625 F.2d 308, 310 (9th Cir. 1980) (where the United
States does not demand extradition and the defendant is deported by authorities of another
country which is a party to an extradition treaty, no extradition has occurred and the failure to
comply with the treaty does not bar prosecution).
222. Customary international law consists of norms that are universally accepted in prac-
tice by the nations of the world.
223. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968); Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187 (1961).
224. The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900). Furthermore, the continual overlooking
of torturous conduct may constitute a " 'consistent pattern of gross ... violations of human
rights' sufficient to enable the individual to complain to the United Nations Human Rights
Commission." Comment, supra note 187, at 1469.
225. See BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 17, at 1.
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courts may be reluctant to exercise the exclusionary rule based on
customary international law, especially in high profile cases against
alleged drug traffickers. Nevertheless, strong policy considerations
are implicated when United States officers participate or acquiesce in
the torture of detainees in violation of international law. The United
States cannot protect the rights of its people internationally if the
United States itself refuses to respect such rights. 226
2. The United Nations Convention Against Torture
In November 1990, the United States ratified the United Nations
Convention Against Torture. The Senate ratification makes the Con-
vention the "supreme law of the land. ' 227 Arguably, victims of tor-
ture now have standing in United States courts to challenge the
conduct of United States law enforcement that violates the terms of
the Convention, regardless of whether their sovereign objects or
not.22 s Article 2 of the United Nations Convention Against Torture
requires that member states "take effective legislative, administrative,
judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture. '229 The exact
nature of this obligation is unclear. United States courts will be called
upon to interpret the nature and scope of this obligation and concomi-
tant remedies for its breach.
226. United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68, 73 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 847 (1975)
(Oakes, J., concurring); see also Garcia Mora, supra note 217. Moreover, the Bush administra-
tion claims to have the power to go beyond international law. Lowenfeld, supra note 104.
Nevertheless, the executive's actions are circumscribed by provisions of the United States
Constitution.
227. Article VI of the United States Constitution declares that treaties made under the
authority of the United States are "the Supreme Law of the Land." Most human rights agree-
ments that the United States has signed are neither self-executing nor ratified by the Senate.
Thus, they are not mandatory, but merely instructive upon the courts in the United States.
Boulesbaa, supra note 17, at 189.
228. Boulesbaa, supra note 17, at 189. This is not surprising since United States courts are
open to suits by aliens for torture committed by aliens. The United Nations Convention
Against Torture does not confer individual rights to challenge mere abduction without torture.
229. United Nations Convention Against Torture, supra note 14, art. 2. In addition, arti-
cle 10 requires:
Each State Party shall ensure that education and information regarding the prohibi-
tion against torture are fully included in the training of law enforcement personnel,
civil or military, medical personnel, public officials and other persons who may be
involved in the custody, interrogation or treatment of any individual subjected to any
form of arrest, detention or imprisonment.
Id. art. 10.
In Case Relative to the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser.
B) No. 10, at 6, the Permanent Court of International Justice held that "a State which has
contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislation such modifications
as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken." Id. at 20.
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United States courts should adopt a Toscanino-type exclusionary
rule for tortured detainees as a necessary method of implementing the
United States obligation under the United Nations Convention
Against Torture. "[W]hether looked at from the point of view of ju-
risdiction, or standing, or remedy,.., the technique developed under
the United States Constitution of deterring official misconduct by
voiding an arrest or conviction has no counterpart (dare one say 'as
yet') in international law or state practice. ' 230 Although the Conven-
tion allows legislative, administrative, and judicial measures to pre-
vent torture, experience reveals that judicial exclusion is the only
truly effective means of deterring covert acts of torture and acquies-
cence to torture. Exclusion is necessary to "take effective measures to
prevent torture."
'231
United States Senate ratification included a "sovereignty reserva-
tion," which states that the United States is obligated under the
United Nations Convention Against Torture only insofar as its terms
are consistent with the Constitution.2 32 This was primarily included
to insure that capital punishment will not be construed as torture
under the Convention's definition. 233 However, it also makes clear
that any laws or remedies, including an exclusionary rule, must be
consistent with the Constitution as interpreted by United States
courts.
International agreements and customary international law are
excellent bases for revitalizing the principles set forth in Toscanino
and its progeny. Ratification of the United Nations Convention
Against Torture gives United States courts and legislatures an oppor-
tunity to focus on torture, and to reconsider the application of the
230. See Lowenfeld, supra note 104, at 477.
231. Article 15 of the United Nations Convention Against Torture requires the exclusion-
ary rule for confessions resulting from torture: "Each state party shall ensure that any state-
ment which is established to have been made as a result of torture shall not be invoked as
evidence in any proceeding, except against a person accused of torture as evidence that the
statement was made." See United Nations Convention Against Torture, supra note 14, art. 15.
232. Senator Helms sponsored the reservation which stated, in part, "[N]othing in this
Convention requires or authorizes legislation or other action, by the United States of America
prohibited by the Constitution of the United States as interpreted by the United States."
Amendment No. 3203, CONG. REC. 17,488 (1990) (statement of Sen. Helms). In addition,
[T]he United States considers itself bound by the obligation under Article 16 to pre-
vent "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment," only insofar as the
term "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or furnishment" [sic] means the cruel,
unusual and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eight,
and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.
Id. at 17,486.
233. N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1990, § A, at 18, col. 1.
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Toscanino principles for egregious police misconduct. 234 However,
courts may be reluctant to extend protection to tortured individuals
based on international agreements, as it may prove to be extremely
expansive. 235 Alternatively, courts may prefer to integrate the United
Nations' standards into the established due process analysis under the
Toscanino exception.
VII. APPLYING THE FIFTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS
STANDARD TO REVITALIZE TOSCANINO-A PROPOSAL
FOR REFORM
Given the consequences of the lack of a strong deterrent for tor-
ture, and the uncertainty of the scope of the United States obligations
under the United Nations Convention Against Torture, United States
courts should focus on the fifth amendment due process clause to
strengthen Toscanino's prohibition of police misconduct. Due pro-
cess is the most practical foundation for revitalizing the Toscanino
exception. While the application of the fourth amendment to the
search and seizure of aliens abroad was questioned in the Verdugo
case, substantive due process of the fifth amendment clearly applies to
all persons, including aliens who are subjected to misconduct that
"shocks the conscience" at the hands of United States law enforce-
ment and their agents. 236 In other words, while aliens abroad may not
be entitled to fourth amendment protection, substantive due process
acts as a limitation upon law enforcement itself.
Moreover, two Supreme Court cases addressing police miscon-
duct in violation of substantive due process provide a solid constitu-
tional foundation for the Toscanino exception. 237 In Rochin,23 the
police obtained evidence used to convict the defendant by forcing an
emetic solution down the defendant's throat, which induced him to
vomit contraband. The contraband evidence was excluded because
234. Recent events, including the beating of Rodney King in Los Angeles, have focused
attention on incidents of brutality by law enforcement officials.
235. The ratification of the United Nations Convention Against Torture may alter the
traditional role of non-inquiry into the treatment of prisoners upon extradition. See generally
BASSIOUNI, supra note 15, ch. VII § 6, ch. IX § 8.3.
236. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1060 (1990); Malloy v. Ho-
gan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
237. "[Ihe twin pillars of our holding (in Toscanino] were Rochin v. California... and
dictum in United States v. Russell... both of which dealt with government conduct of a most
shocking and outrageous character." Ex reL Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 65 (2d Cir. 1975)
(citations omitted).
238. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
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the manner in which it was obtained shocked the conscience. 239 In
Russell,24o the Supreme Court held that police entrapment activities
involving a narcotics manufacturing scheme did not so shock the con-
science as to violate the Constitution.241 However, Justice Rehnquist
stated that "we may some day be presented with a situation in which
the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due pro-
cess principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking
judicial processes to obtain a conviction.
'242
Most circuit courts have retained the possibility of using the fifth
amendment due process clause when police misconduct reaches an
unacceptable level of egregiousness. Thus, due process constitutes the
most viable justification for an exclusionary rule in cases of extraterri-
torial police misconduct. However, the standard of conduct required
to invoke due process protection must be defined in order to give po-
lice agencies a standard by which they can formulate their policy and
training.
243
A. Defining an Appropriate Standard for Police Misconduct that
Violates Due Process of Law
The Toscanino court stated that the extremely egregious conduct
239. Id. at 172.
240. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
241. Id at 432.
242. Id. at 431-32. Justice Rehnquist held that the governmental participation in the crea-
tion of a drug laboratory was not sufficiently egregious as to violate "fundamental fairness" or
shock the universal sense of justice. Id.
For a case in which government misconduct did shock the conscience, see United States v.
Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978), where the court held that police misconduct in helping the
defendant create a laboratory to produce an illegal narcotic was so overreaching that it vio-
lated the due process clause of the fifth amendment. In Twigg, a DEA agent solicited a third
party and the defendant to join him in establishing a methamphetamine ("speed") laboratory.
The government supplied the necessary ingredients, tools, building, and almost all the supplies.
The defendant had no personal knowledge about how to manufacture speed. The district
court held that the defendant could not use the entrapment defense because he had been
brought into the scheme by a third party and not by the police. The Third Circuit reversed the
conviction, stating that the government involvement in the criminal activities reached a "de-
monstrable level of outrageousness" so as to divest the court of jurisdiction. Id at 380. "This
court cannot 'shirk the responsibility that is necessarily in its keeping.., to accommodate the
dangers of overzealous law enforcement and civilized methods adequate to counter the ingenu-
ity of modern criminals.'" Id If these facts constitute outrageous conduct, surely torture
would be proscribed by due process.
243. "Courts need to identify with greater precision those areas where constitutional safe-
guards properly should exist; [otherwise], the government [will] be free to rely on its judgment
without threat of judicial interference." Stephan, Constitutional Limits on International Ren-
dition of Criminal Suspects, 20 VA. J. INT'L L. 777, 800 (1980).
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alleged by Toscanino was precisely the type of conduct that violated
due process, as referred to by Justice Rehnquist in Russell.2"4 How-
ever, the exact measure of police misconduct or brutality against ab-
ducted individuals that violates due process has not been clearly
defined. In practice, the courts have been very permissive of police
misconduct abroad.245 One court cited the Toscanino standard as be-
ing " 'discretionary' . . . in the sense that there is 'no law to apply'-
i.e., no standards to guide the trial court's decision."
'246
Recently, some courts have considered the "set of incidents"
247
alleged in Toscanino as a threshold of misconduct necessary to invoke
substantive due process. 248 Considering the Toscanino facts as a set of
incidents makes the due process hurdle even more difficult for defen-
dants to overcome. Requiring a specific series of outrageous acts sug-
gests that no single allegation of torture, such as electrically shocking
genitals or forcing fluids in anal cavities, will rise to the level of egre-
giousness sufficient to divest the court of jurisdiction. In this way,
courts can justify their acquiescence to a single act of brutality, on the
basis that the entirety of the torturous episode did not rise to the egre-
giousness of Toscanino.
For example, in Matta-Ballesteros,249 the defendant alleged that
he had been kidnapped, beaten, and shocked with a stun gun on his
244. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 276.
245. Where less outrageous conduct is at issue, courts have applied Ker-Frisbie rather than
the Toscanino exception. See, e.g., United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1981) (defend-
ant was forced to lie on the floor of a small plane for thirty minutes with a gun cocked at his
head. Upon deplaning, his arm was twisted as officers walked him to the airport. This con-
duct was not like the "cruel, inhumane and outrageous treatment allegedly suffered by Tos-
canino."); United States v. Sorren, 605 F.2d 1211 (lst Cir. 1979) (officials insulted, pushed,
and slapped defendant during his arrest, as well as forced him to sleep on the floor in the
corner of the jail to avoid having urine splashed on him. The court held that this conduct did
not rise to the level of outrageousness to invoke due process); United States v. Lara, 539 F.2d
495 (5th Cir. 1976) (forcible abduction without torture is insufficient); Lujan, 510 F.2d at 62
(defendant did not allege any misconduct that was present in Toscanino but merely that his
arrest was illegal).
246. Nalls v. Rolls-Royce, Ltd., 702 F.2d 255, 259 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
247. In United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 909, 919 (D.D.C. 1988) and Matta-Balles-
teros ex rel. Stolar v. Henman, 697 F. Supp. 1040, 1047 (S.D. Ill. 1988), aff'd, 396 F.2d 255
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 209 (1990), the courts characterized the facts alleged in
Toscanino as a threshold "set of incidents" to implicate the due process clause of the fifth
amendment.
248. In Yunis, the court directly referred to Toscanino as the standard when it stated,
"The extensive torture suffered by the defendant in Toscanino is worthy of recitation to illus-
trate the benchmark for the type of outrageous conduct necessary to invoke the exception to
Ker-Frisbie and warrant the radical remedy of dismissal." Yunis, 681 F. Supp. at 919.
249. 697 F. Supp. at 1040.
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genitals and feet by United States Marshals. 250 Matta supported his
claim by providing a physician's report of the medical examination he
received at Marion Penitentiary, which revealed that he had suffered
abrasions on his head, face, scalp, neck, arms, feet, and penis, and
blistering on his back.251 The district court stated, "[E]ven if the Tos-
canino exception were to be applied in the Seventh Circuit, the Court
finds that, as a matter of law, the allegations of [Matta] do not rise to
the threshold standard of Toscanino.' ' 252 Therefore, "as a matter of
law, ... [t]he allegations of torture do not meet the required level of
outrageousness, nor do they shock the conscience to the extent that
they would require the court to . . . [divest] ...jurisdiction over
him.',253
The court went on to say that by Matta's own admission, his
interrogation lasted "little more than 24 hours. ' 25 4 Amazingly, the
court implied that twenty-four hours of physical abuse did not meet
the "threshold standard" of seventeen days of interrogation endured
by Toscanino.25" A due process standard that fails to condemn such
conduct by United States law enforcement with the most effective
sanction mocks the ideals of liberty and justice embodied in the
United States Constitution.
1. Adopting an International Standard
By applying the Toscanino set of incidents as the due process
standard, United States courts tolerate severe brutality by law en-
forcement agents. Given the United States' obligations under the
United Nations Convention Against Torture and the universal con-
demnation of this type of conduct, United States courts should adopt
the definition of torture formulated by the United Nations Conven-
tion Against Torture for the Toscanino due process analysis.
256 Arti-
cle 1 of the Convention defines torture as:
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted by or at the instigation of a public
250. Id. at 1042.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 1047.
253. Id. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit rejected the Toscanino exception altogether.
Matta-Ballesteros, 896 F.2d at 263.
254. Matta-Ballesteros, 697 F. Supp. at 1047.
255. Id. It is absurd to even imply that torture sufficient to violate due process is any less
likely to be perpetrated in twenty-four hours than in seventeen days.
256. United Nations Convention Against Torture, supra note 14.
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official on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a
third person information or confession, punishing him for an act he
has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidat-
ing him or other persons. It does not include pain or suffering aris-
ing from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions to the extent
consistent with the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of
Prisoners.
257
The definition acknowledges that these types of practices are univer-
sally prohibited by customary international law. 258 In Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, the Second Circuit recognized the United Nations Con-
vention Against Torture definition as the consensus standard of cus-
tomary international law. It stated that the significance of the
Convention is that it "speciffies] with great precision the obligations
of member nations under the charter. ' 259 As a constitutional stan-
dard, the definition solidifies the shocking the conscience standard of
Rochin and Russell. It defines police misconduct with sufficient par-
ticularity so that police officials may know what limits to place on
interrogation policies. At the same time, the definition allows the
courts to develop a body of law that defines police misconduct with
greater specificity. More importantly, it applies to any action by
United States law enforcement, regardless of the heinousness of the
criminal, and is not the unattainable set of incidents described in Tos-
canino. Under the United Nations Convention Against Torture stan-
dard, the alleged conduct of United States law enforcement officials in
Matta-Ballesteros would be clearly unconstitutional.
2. Defining the Degree of United States Involvement in the
Outrageous Conduct to Implicate Toscanino
In various cases, circuit courts have stated that facts existed that
rose to the set of incidents sufficient to invoke Toscanino. However, in
each of these cases, the court avoided exercising the Toscanino excep-
tion by finding United States agents were not directly involved with
257. The Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners were adopted August
30, 1955. First United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of
Offenders, Annex 1 (A), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.6 (1956). Article 31 states that "corporal pun-
ishment, punishment by placing in a dark cell, and all cruel, inhuman or degrading punish-
ments shall be completely prohibited as punishments for disciplinary offences." Id art. 31.
Article 32 states that no punishment shall be inflicted that "may be prejudicial to the physical
or mental health of a prisoner." Id art. 32, para. 2.
258. See BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 17, at 1.
259. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 883 (2d Cir. 1980).
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the torture of the defendant. 26°
In Lira,261 the court stated that the due process clause of the fifth
amendment is invoked only when the allegedly improper conduct is
taken "by or at the direction of United States officials. ' 262 Torture
perpetrated solely by foreign agents is not subject to due process re-
view, and cannot be the basis for divestiture of jurisdiction under Tos-
canino.263 However, more difficult questions arise when United States
agents do not expressly direct or actively engage in the illegal actions,
but merely encourage, consent, acquiesce to, or set in motion the com-
mission of torture by foreign agents.
For example, in Lira, the defendant was arrested by Chilean po-
lice at the request of United States DEA agents.264 During his deten-
tion, Lira allegedly was brutally tortured in a manner similar to that
of Toscanino. During the torture, Lira heard English being spoken
softly, and saw two DEA agents in the Chilean prosecutor's office.
265
Lira was finally placed on a plane accompanied by one of the DEA
agents. 266 Despite the obvious inference that DEA agents were pres-
ent during his interrogation and were at least aware of his ordeal, the
court stated that Lira's evidentiary hearing "produced no proof that
representatives of the United States participated or acquiesced in the
alleged misconduct of the Chilean officials. '267 At the conclusion of
its analysis, the court used slightly different words to define the stan-
dard of involvement sufficient to invoke due process restrictions. The
court stated that "where the United States Government plays no di-
rect or substantial role in the misconduct," a judicial penalty should
not be levied against the government.26
8
In United States v. Marzano,269 the Seventh Circuit held that, in
order to determine whether United States government participation
rendered a search "government action," all facts surrounding the
260. See supra note 111. "A large number of cases have turned on the assertion by the
U.S. Government as prosecutor, that the really brutal acts were committed (if at all) by the
foreign state... but not by officers of the DEA or FBI." Lowenfeld, supra note 104, at 489.
261. United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 423 U.S. 847 (1975).
262. Id. at 70 (quoting Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 281 (emphasis added)).
263. Id. at 71.
264. Id. at 69.
265. Id.
266. Lira, 515 F.2d at 70.
267. Id (emphasis added).
268. Id. at 71.
269. 537 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1978).
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search must be examined. 270 In that case, United States agents re-
quested Marzano's arrest and gave information to Cayman Islands
officials which led directly to his arrest. The United States agents
were present during Marzano's interrogation, but were not allowed to
carry weapons or participate in the questioning. 27' In addition, the
agents offered to pay for Marzano's flight back to Miami. 272 Marzano
claimed that the United States' presence during his abduction and in-
terrogation made his arrest and detention the product of a joint ven-
ture for which the United States was responsible. 273 The court
disagreed, and held that merely providing information and being pres-
ent at the interrogation was insufficient to hold the United States of-
ficers liable as participants. 2
74
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Swygert maintained that the
United States' involvement was sufficient to invoke constitutional re-
strictions.275 He noted that the Federal Bureau of Investigations
("FBI") actively involved itself in the process which returned Mar-
zano to the United States. Judge Swygert wrote, "The defendant is
correct in arguing: But for the instigation of the FBI, the defendant
would never have been arrested and searched on the Grand Cayman
Island. But for the aid of the FBI in supplying the Grand Cayman
agent with the defendant's photograph, no arrest could have been
made. ' 276 And, more importantly, "but for" their involvement, Mar-
zano would not have been arrested and brought to justice in the
United States.277 Accordingly, "[I]f the federal officials 'had a hand'
in the search, 'before the object of the search was completely accom-
plished,' it becomes a joint operation, and the federal officials must be
deemed to have participated in it."'278 United States law enforcement
agencies often provide information and resources to help foreign
agents locate and detain fugitives sought by the United States. When
this assistance is an essential element in capturing fugitives, it is diffi-
cult to argue that the United States government is not a participant. 279




274. Marzano, 537 F.2d at 270.
275. Id. at 276 (Swygert J., dissenting).
276. Id. at 279-80.
277. Id. at 280.
278. Id. at 281.
279. Judge Swygert posited this argument in his dissenting opinion in Marzano, 537 F.2d
at 276.
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In United States v. Degallado,280 the court stated that the degree
of United States involvement sufficient to invoke Toscanino "is not
entirely clear. '281 In that case, DEA agents solicited the assistance of
the Mexican federal judicial police to arrest Degallado in Mexico and
deliver him to the DEA.282 Degallado was subsequently detained in a
hotel room by Mexican officers, two DEA agents, and two others
from the Texas Department of Public Safety. 283 Degallado was held
down on a bed by Mexican officers, with his hands bound behind him.
The Mexican officers interrogated him, and periodically sprayed selt-
zer water in his nose.284 Degallado claimed that after forty-five min-
utes he was blindfolded and subjected to approximately four hours of
torture by electric prod-all of this in the presence of the four United
States officers.
285
At Degallado's Toscanino hearing, the DEA agents admitted to
being present in the hotel room during the first forty-five minutes of
Degallado's ordeal. The agents claimed that they observed the seltzer
being sprayed in Degallado's nose, but neither participated in the ac-
tivity nor did anything to stop it. In fact, the DEA agents claimed
that the abusive treatment of Degallado is what prompted them to
leave the hotel. One agent stated, "It was getting plenty rough. It
was something that I was not accustomed to. It scared the fire out of
me and we left. ' ' 286 The court stated that "while this conduct may
not have been heroic, it is not tantamount to deliberately participating
in the activities of the Mexican police. ' 287 This may be true, but
clearly the United States agents knowingly acquiesced in the torture
of Degallado, and subsequently obtained custody of him through the
officers who tortured him.
As these cases illustrate, the proper standard for establishing
government participation in the mistreatment of pretrial detainees is
extremely elusive. Moreover, United States courts have applied this
vague standard in an inconsistent, result-oriented manner to avoid ap-
280. 696 F. Supp. 1136 (S.D. Tex. 1988).
281. Id. at 1137.
282. Id. at 1138.
283. Id.
284. Id. This is a form of torture designed to inflict severe head pain.
285. Further, Degallado claimed that at some point his interrogators switched to a more
powerful electrical device, which he was told had been furnished by the United States agents.
Degallado, 696 F. Supp. at 1138.




plying the exclusionary remedy. 288 The lack of a definitive standard
for the degree of United States involvement necessary to create consti-
tutional responsibility for the torturous acts of foreign agents has sig-
nificantly contributed to the decline of Toscanino's protection.
Consequently, the Ker-Frisbie doctrine has been effectively expanded
to countenance numerous forms of torture and brutality perpetrated
by foreign agents in conjunction with United States officials.
What is the appropriate degree of involvement to hold United
States law enforcement officials responsible for torture conducted by
foreign officials? The United States government itself proposed a
standard for official involvement, during the drafting of the United
Nations Convention Against Torture. 289 The United States suggested
that article 1 read: "For the purpose of the present Convention, the
offence of torture includes any act by which extremely severe pain or
suffering, whether physical or mental, is deliberately and maliciously
inflicted on a person by or with the consent or acquiescence of a pub-
lic official. '' 29°
"Public official" is defined as follows:
1. A public official is any person vested with exercise of some
official power of the state, either civil or military.
2. Any public official who (a) consents to an act of torture,
288. For example, United States courts have declined to follow Toscanino where there was
insufficient United States involvement to implicate due process under the Lira analysis. See,
e.g., United States v. Sorren, 668 F.2d 32, 37 (1st Cir. 1981) (a United States DEA agent set up
a narcotics purchase in Panama. Sorren was arrested during the purchase by Panamanian
officials, jailed, and physically abused, although apparently not to the Toscanino level. Sorren
saw the United States agent one time while he was in the custody of Panamanian officials. This
was held to be insufficient United States involvement); United States v. Lara, 539 F.2d 495 (5th
Cir. 1976) (at an evidentiary hearing, the court assumed torture had been administered by
Panamanian authorities, but found that United States agents played no "direct role" in it);
United States v. Lopez, 542 F.2d 283, 284 (5th Cir. 1976) (defendant alleged torture for eight
days by Dominican Republic authorities at the instigation of the United States. Following his
interrogation, the defendant was flown back to the United States in the custody of an FBI
agent. The court held there was no direct United States involvement with the interrogation by
foreign officials).
Conversely, where United States agents clearly participated in or directed detention and
interrogation, courts have held, without exception, that the severity of the illegal conduct was
insufficient to rise to the level of the set of incidents in Toscanino. See supra note 112.
289. See BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 17, at 41. In December 1977, the United
Nations General Assembly requested the Commission on Human Rights to create a draft Con-
vention Against Torture. In January 1978, Sweden completed this preliminary draft. From
1980 through 1984, the draft was elaborated by a working group of delegations from the 43
State members of the Commission as of 1980. Id. at 32 n. 1. The United States was one of the
Commission member States. Id. at 41.
290. Id.
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(b) assists, incites, solicits, commands, or conspires with others to
commit torture, or (c) fails to take appropriate measures to prevent
or suppress torture when such person has knowledge or should have
knowledge that torture has or is being committed and has the au-
thority or is in a position to take such measures, also commits the
offence of torture within the meaning of this Convention.
291
This definition suggests that United States law enforcement officials
must not only refuse to participate in torture, but must also take af-
firmative measures to ensure that they do not acquiesce in such ac-
tions.292 United States courts should adopt this standard of
involvement for applying the Toscanino exception in order to fulfill
the United States' obligations under the ratified United Nations Con-
vention Against Torture. Applying the exclusionary rule under this
standard would force the United States to insure that its law enforce-
ment activities are free from coercion and brutality, even if those ac-
tivities are in conjunction with agents from other nations. Moreover,
given that the United States usually initiates joint operations, bears
their expense, and prosecutes the accuseds, the collaborations de-
scribed in Lira, Marzano, and Degallado would clearly violate this
United .Nations due process standard.293
It has been asserted that the ultimate question in defining the
degree of United States involvement sufficient to make the actions of
foreign agents those of the United States is whether the purposes of
the exclusionary remedy, particularly the deterrence of torture, would
be furthered by applying the United Nations definition. 294 By con-
ducting joint venture law enforcement activities with nations that en-
gage in inhuman conduct, the United States knowingly acquiesces in
conduct that violates its obligations under the United Nations Con-
vention Against Torture and the due process clause. United States
law enforcement agencies dealing with foreign agents are generally
aware of the policies and activities of their foreign counterparts. By
291. Id. at 42 (emphasis added).
292. Such affarmative measures are not uncommon to international agreements. The In-
ter-American Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S. Off. Rec. DEA/ser.K/XVI/I.1, doc. 65,
rev.1, corr. 1 (1970), makes its member States insurers of human rights:
An illegal act which violates human rights and which is initially not directly imputa-
ble to a state (for example, because it is the act of a private person or because the
person responsible has not been identified) can lead to international responsibility of
the State, not because of the act itself, but because of the lack of due diligence to
prevent the violation or to respond to it as the Convention requires.
Id. art. 2.
293. Lowenfeld, supra note 104, at 489.
294. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 442, 488-89 (1971).
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acquiescing in torture and benefitting from information obtained dur-
ing torture, these United States law enforcement agencies impliedly
condone such activities.
Moreover, allowing United States law enforcement agents to
profit from foreign agents' misconduct stimulates a demand for the
use of brutal interrogation techniques by foreign law enforcement.
United States agents may prefer allowing foreign agents to capture
and interrogate fugitives, since such agents are currently unhampered
by constitutional restraints against torture.295 Divesting United States
courts of jurisdiction for merely consenting or acquiescing to brutal
conduct of foreign officials would not only deter torture directly per-
petrated by United States agents, but would also deter the misconduct
of foreign agents. The strict United Nations participation standard
creates an incentive for United States officials to warn foreign agents
against unconstitutional misconduct, and encourages them to respect
the principles against torture that the United States professes.
B. Effective Procedures for Analyzing Claims of Torture Under the
Due Process Clause
The need to place an affirmative duty on United States law en-
forcement officials to prevent torture, as defined by the United Na-
tions Convention Against Torture, is accentuated by the fact that
torture is often executed covertly. Concrete standards alone are insuf-
ficient to preserve the deterrent effect of the Toscanino exception, be-
cause it is invariably difficult for victims to substantiate their
allegations at evidentiary hearings. Therefore, procedural mecha-
nisms must be devised to elicit information about arrests and interro-
gations from government agencies that have access to such
information.
Toscanino set forth the procedure for challenging United States
district court jurisdiction based on patent violations of due process. 296
The Toscanino court stated that a defendant is entitled to "an eviden-
tiary hearing with respect to ... allegations of forcible abduction only
if, in response to the government's denial, he [or she] offers some cred-
ible supporting evidence, including specifically evidence that the ac-
295. Foreign law enforcement agencies may have limited financial resources and therefore
use torture and other shortcut methods of investigation as routine, cost-efficient methods of
fighting crime. However, when the United States is involved, cost factors are no justification
for subverting constitutional proscriptions.
296. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 281; United States v. Orsini, 402 F. Supp. 1218, 1219
(E.D.N.Y. 1975).
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tion was taken by or at the direction of United States officials. '297
The district court may review the evidence produced by a defendant
and grant or deny hearings at its discretion. 298 Once a defendant has
met this burden of producing evidence, he or she is granted a Tos-
canino hearing. 299 At the hearing, a defendant must prove that he or
she had been subjected to "conduct of the most outrageous and repre-
hensible kind ... perpetrated by representatives of the United States
government. '"
aoo
The initial evidentiary burden to obtain a Toscanino hearing is
difficult to satisfy. Even Toscanino was unable to produce sufficient
evidence to warrant an evidentiary hearing. 301 In the seventeen years
since Toscanino, very few defendants have met the burden of produc-
ing evidence of torture necessary to obtain a Toscanino hearing. 30 2
Those who did obtain hearings failed to carry their burden of proof to
divest the court of jurisdiction.
30 3
Torture victims fail to carry their burden of proof for a variety of
reasons, most of which are unrelated to questions of whether they
were actually tortured. Victims often cannot identify their abductors,
which makes it all but impossible to prove the degree of United States
involvement. 3°4 In addition, the methods of torture routinely used are
insidiously designed to leave little or no physical evidence of the de-
gree of abuse.30 5 Moreover, there may be reciprocal agreements or
understandings between foreign and United States officials for the
297. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 281; see also United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896, 901 (2d Cir.
1981) (defendant entitled to an evidentiary hearing if he offered some credible proof that the
actions against him were taken by or at the direction of United States officials).
298. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 281. "The Toscanino issue exemplifies the case in which the
district court exercises discretion because there is no law to apply; as to the circumstances in
which the trial court enjoyed discretion as to whether to hold a hearing, the court's remand
was essentially standardless." Nails v. Rolls-Royce, Ltd., 702 F.2d 255, 259-60 (D.C. Cir.
1983). See also Midway Mfg. Co. v. Omni Video Games, Inc., 668 F.2d 70, 72 (1st Cir. 1981)
(no statutory standards at all governing the decision that the court declined to review).
299. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 281. In Matta-Ballesteros, the Seventh Circuit held that the
defendant had not carried his burden of producing evidence to obtain a Toscanino hearing
despite a physician's report from Marion Penitentiary showing severe injuries sustained during
his 24-hour interrogation. Matta-Ballesteros, 896 F.2d at 256, 258.
300. Lujan, 510 F.2d at 65.
301. Toscanino, 398 F. Supp. at 916.
302. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
303. Id.
304. See supra notes 111-12.
305. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 270. "[A]gents of the United States government attached
electrodes to Toscanino's earlobes, toes, and genitals. Jarring jolts of electricity were shot
through his body, rendering him unconscious for indeterminate periods of time but again leav-
ing no physical scars." Id.
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covert abduction and interrogation of individuals abroad.306
Because of this severe evidentiary handicap, United States courts
should shift the evidentiary burdens to strengthen the deterrent effect
of the Toscanino exception. First, a defendant should be granted a
Toscanino hearing upon a prima facie showing that he or she was
tortured as defined by the United Nations standard, regardless of
whether he or she can substantiate United States involvement.
30 7
This would create a presumption of United States involvement, based
on the fact that the defendant's abduction and interrogation resulted
in his or her custody by United States officials. At the hearing, the
burden of proof should shift to the prosecution to show that United
States agents were not involved with the alleged torture of the defend-
ant. This is a proper allocation of burdens, because the United States
government, having obtained custody of the defendant, is more able
to access information regarding the defendant's arrest and pretrial
detention. 30
8
If the prosecution fails to carry the burden of showing no United
States involvement, the prosecution should then bear the burden of
proving that the pretrial treatment of the defendant did not constitute
torture, as defined by the United Nations Convention Against Tor-
ture. The government could meet this burden by producing verifiable
evidence that the defendant's injuries were inflicted prior to arrest, or
resulted from reasonable force during arrest or restraint during deten-
tion. 309 This burden shifting is appropriate, because the government
has more effective control of the relevant evidence than does the de-
fendant. 310 As one commentator noted:
306. United States v. Orsini, 424 F. Supp. 229, 230 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); NEWSWEEK, Aug.
16, 1976.
307. Conduct rising to the United Nation's definition of torture may be established by the
submission of sworn affidavits. Article 13 of the Convention states, "Each state Party shall
ensure that any individual who alleges he has been subjected to torture in any territory under
its jurisdiction has the right to complain to, and to have his case promptly and impartially
examined by competent authorities." United Nations Convention Against Torture, supra note
14, art. 13.
308. For example, in Lira, the defendant claimed he heard English spoken while he was
being tortured in Chile. Lira, 515 F.2d at 69. He also saw two DEA agents at the Chilean
Prosecutor's office, and was accompanied by one of the agents on his return to the United
States. Id. at 70. Shifting the burden to the prosecution to show the extent of United States
involvement with Chilean authorities would elicit the truth and deter torture by both the
United States and foreign officials.
309. The government might also show that the treatment of the defendant was a lawful
sanction, consistent with the Standard Minimum Rules for Treatment of Prisoners.
310. Interrogation records, photographs, and medical reports are usually kept in the cus-
tody of law enforcement agencies. Incident to the shifting of evidentiary burdens is the need to
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[E]vidence and witnesses are located in a foreign jurisdiction which
is often thousands of miles away, and the apprehending govern-
ment is not likely to admit to its illegal behavior. This problem is
particularly acute in cases in which the government defends itself
by claiming that the defendant was delivered to it by agents of the
asylum state.
311
The Inter-American Court on Human Rights utilized a similar
type of burden shifting in Velasquez-Rodriguez.31 2 In that case, Man-
fredo Velasquez was violently detained without a warrant by agents of
the National Office- of Investigation and the Honduran Armed
Forces.313 Velasquez was charged with political crimes, and subjected
to harsh interrogation and cruel torture.3 14 Five days later, Velasquez
was allegedly moved to a military installation where his interrogation
continued.31 5
Four weeks after Velasquez's abduction, the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights ("Commission") sent a petition to the
government of Honduras, requesting information about Velasquez's
whereabouts.31 6 When the government failed to reply, the Commis-
sion issued Resolution 30/83, applying article 42 of its regulations. 317
Article 42 shifted the burden of proof to the Honduran government
by presuming as true all of the allegations in the petition concerning
allow broad discovery for the defendant to obtain information from government agencies. See
Orsini, where the court granted the prosecution's motion to quash the defendant's subpoena
duces tecum which allegedly sought information pertaining to his unlawful arrest and mistreat-
ment. Orsini, 424 F. Supp. at 229.
311. See Feinrider, supra note 164, at 36.
312. INTER-AM. C.H.R. 76, OEA/ser. I./R./19.23, doc. 25 rev. 3 61 (1988) (Velasquez-
Rodriguez case, Judgment of July 29, 1988) (cited in CENTRAL AMERICAN REFUGEE
CENTER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TRAINING MANUAL 76 (1990)).
313. CENTRAL AMERICAN REFUGEE CENTER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
TRAINING MANUAL 76 (1990).
314. Id. at 77. The exact nature of Velasquez's torture may never be known. The Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights submitted the petition to the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights. The allegations contained in the petition were taken from eyewitnesses who
said they had seen Velasquez abducted and taken to Public Security Forces Station No. 2,
located in the Barrio El Manchen of Tegulcigalpa, Honduras. Id
315. Id
316. Id
317. Id. Article 42 states:
The facts reported in the petition whose pertinent parts have been transmitted to the
government of the State in reference shall be presumed to be true if, during the maxi-
mum period set by the Commission under the provisions of Article 34 paragraph 5,
the government has not provided the pertinent information, as long as other evidence




Velasquez's detention and disappearance.3 1 8 Five years later, the
Commission issued Resolution 22/86, stating, "Velasquez is still miss-
ing and... the Government of Honduras... has not offered convinc-
ing proof that would allow the Commission to determine that the
allegations are not true.
319
The Commission brought the case before the Inter-American
Court on April 24, 1986. The court approved the shifting of burdens,
stating that "presumptive evidence is especially important in allega-
tions of disappearances, because this type of repression is character-
ized by its attempt to suppress any information about the kidnapping
or the whereabouts and fate of the victim. ' 320 The court also empha-
sized that "[iun proceedings to determine human rights violations the
State cannot rely on the defense that the complainant has failed to
present evidence when such cannot be obtained without the State's
cooperation.
3 21
This rationale for shifting the burden of proof applies with equal
force to cases involving the United States' involvement with the tor-
ture of pretrial detainees. Government agencies involved in abduction
and interrogation control the information needed to verify the mis-
conduct of their agents. A rebuttable presumption compels disclosure
of important information that may implicate executive actions and
policies encouraging or acquiescing in improper conduct. In short,
shifting the burden of proof is the most effective way of ensuring that
Toscanino's prophylactic rule is effective in practice.
VIII. CONCLUSION
A strong correlation exists between constitutional restrictions on
police procedures and incidents of police misconduct. United States
policies on the jurisdiction of its courts, the constitutional restraints
on United States law enforcement, and government-directed abduc-
tion and brutality abroad are necessarily interrelated.3 22 Law enforce-
ment officials will tend to zealously pursue their goals and extend
their powers until they are restrained by the legislature, civil actions,
public perception of police activities, and, most importantly, judi-
cially-created deterrents based on the Bill of Rights. Judicial toler-
318. Id. at 77. The court stated that "such acts are most serious violations of the right to
life (art. 4) and the right to personal liberty (art. 7) of the American Convention." Id at 77.
319. Id. at 78.
320. Id at 101-02.
321. Id at 102.
322. See Lowenfeld, supra note 104, at 489.
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ance of torture incident to abduction and detention of aliens allows
law enforcement to operate abroad free from constitutional limita-
tions. Narrowing and restricting the Toscanino exception to the Ker-
Frisbie doctrine has corresponded with the expansion and acceptance
of these types of covert activities. With the advent of the war on
drugs, it is likely that the number of abductions of aliens abroad will
continue to rise and law enforcement interrogation techniques will ex-
pand.3 23 The judiciary should act now to strengthen and enforce con-
stitutional limitations on police handling of pre-trial detainees.
Fifteen years after writing the majority opinion in Lujan, Judge
Kaufman responded to a letter to the editor of the New York Times
which criticized protections of criminal defendants in the war on
drugs. Judge Kaufman wrote, "[E]ven in 'war,' there are rules-as
formulated in the Constitution. Blind efficiency should never become
the ultimate goal of a constitutional democracy.... While it is nice to
have the trains run on time, it is equally important that national pol-
icy goals be implemented constitutionally. '324
Toscanino created an exception to the general rule that pretrial
police misconduct does not affect the court's power to try and convict
a defendant. Toscanino held that a court should divest itself of juris-
diction over a criminal defendant when the government engages in
offensive pretrial conduct, such as torture. The Toscanino exception
has been rejected by at least one circuit, and severely limited in most
others. The proposals contained in this Comment constitute a practi-
cal method of revitalizing the Toscanino exception within a constitu-
tional framework that takes into account the practical needs of law
enforcement.
The proposals include borrowing the definitions of torture and
state responsibility from the United Nations Convention Against Tor-
ture, and applying these definitions in the fifth amendment due pro-
cess context. To make these standards effective, the evidentiary
burdens at Toscanino hearings should be shifted to the prosecution to
flush out the truth and give the defendant an opportunity to prove
allegations of torture. If a defendant can make a prima facie showing
of torture, and if the prosecution fails to show that United States
agents were not involved, the court should shift the burden to the
323. Moveover, "the 'war on drugs' is a metaphor. Real war permits-sometimes re-
quires-relaxation of restraints on governmental action: law enforcement-investigation,
arrest, trial, sentence, punishment-is law, not war, and therefore a reflection of our values-
our peacetime abiding values." Id. at 491.
324. N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1989, at A22, col. 4.
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prosecution to show that the alleged conduct did not rise to the level
of torture defined in the United Nations Convention Against Torture.
This procedure comports with the Supreme Court's endorsement
of Ker-Frisbie and the narrowed interpretation of the Toscanino ex-
ception which proscribes torture but allows mere abduction. It per-
mits law enforcement to continue its common, and apparently
necessary, practice of abducting fugitives abroad, at least until effi-
cient and effective methods of obtaining fugitives abroad can be
promulgated. However, this procedure clearly limits the expanding
Ker-Frisbie doctrine by drawing a bright line on torture and providing
an effective disincentive for police to engage or acquiesce in torture.
It creates guidelines by which law enforcement needs can be squared
with due process, thereby maintaining the respect and credibility of
the law. As Justice Brandeis wrote in Olmstead v. United States:
325
Decency, security, and liberty alike demand that government
officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are
commands to the citizen. In a government of laws, existence of the
government will be imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupu-
lously. Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher.
For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example.
Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it
breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto
himself, it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of
the criminal law the end justifies the means-to declare that the
government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction
of a private criminal-would bring terrible retribution.
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